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IN THE SUPRE11E COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD A. DYSON, STEPHEN F. 
KESLER, W.T. BISSELL, RONALD 
McCLAIN, DONALD L. OBORN, and 
ELMO WALKER, 
Plaintiffs, (Donald A. 
Dyson, Appellant), 
vs. 
AVIATION OFFICE OF AMERICA, 
INCORPORATED, a Texas cor-
poration, and RANGER INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, a New York cor-
poration and KENNETH R. SHAN-
NON, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 15661 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS A.O.A. AND 
RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was originally commenced by Dyson, Kesler, 
Bissell, McClain, Oborn, and Walker against Aviation Office 
of America (A.O.A.), Ranger Insurance Company, (Ranger) and 
Kenneth R. Shannon. Plaintiffs (owners of plane) claimed a 
breach of contract by the insurance company (Ranger) and its 
underwriting group (A.O.A.) alleging that the company failed to 
properly issue an insurance policy covering the loss to a Cess-
na airplane. (R., pp. 2-5). Plaintiffs' claim against Shannon 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was for negligence in crashing the airplane. (R. I pp. 6-7). 
A third-party complaint was filed by A.O.A. and Ranger 
against Plaintiff, Dyson, an insurance agent, and his insurance 
agency alleging that Dyson and his agency indemnify the company 
for any money paid to the plaintiffs caused by Dyson's negli-
gence, breach of duty, or intentional misrepresentation of 
facts. (R., pp. 18-21). 
Dyson and his agency counterclaimed against Ranger and 
A.O.A. alleging that they had impliedly provided coverage to 
the plaintiffs and had also committed negligence in failing to 
advise Dyson that no coverage was provided. (R. I pp. 72-76). 
Finally, Plaintiffs, Kesler, Bissell, McClain, Oborn, 
and Walker filed a cross-claim and third-party complaint 
against Dyson and his agency alleging that Dyson had breached 
his contract to obtain insurance for the other plaintiffs. (R., 
pp. 54-57). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, found in favor 
of A.O.A. and Ranger and against the plaintiffs, no cause of 
action, on the complaint. However, it did enter judgment in 
favor of the other plaintiffs against Dyson on their cross-
claim and third-party complaint in the amount of $27,000. Fin-
ally, the trial court entered judgment, no cause of action, in 
favor of A.O.A. and Ranger against Dyson and his agency on the 
Dyson cross-claim against the insurance carrier. (R., pp. 284-
-2-
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286} • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents A.O.A. and Ranger Insurance Company seek af-
firmance of the lower court's decision as to all parties on 
all causes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Judge Croft, wrote an extensive memorandum opinion con-
cerning this litigation. (R., pp. 249-269}. This opinion is 
attached for this Court's convenience hereto as an Appendix. 
While these respondents do not disagree with the majority of 
the statement of facts as set forth in Appellants' brief, there 
have been many important facts and items of testimony omitted 
from Appellants' Statement. Rather than supplementing Appel-
lants' Statement of Facts at this juncture, these Respor.dents 
shall rely upon abstracted portions of the Statement of Facts 
made by Judge Croft in his Memorandum Opinion with appropriate 
references to the record added in support thereof. In addition, 
further facts and testimony of the witnesses shall be discussed 
in detail in the various sub-parts of the argument portion of 
this brief. 
The following is the pertinent portion of Judge Croft's 
Memorandum decision relating to the factual background: (R., 
pp. 253-260; App., pp. A-6- A-17}. 
"In this memorandum I shall not undertake to summarize the 
-3-
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testimony of the respective witnesses as called, but rather 
will summarize what I consider to be the material and relevant 
facts as established by the evidence. 
"AOA underwrites aviation insurance for Ranger and other 
insurance companies, and as such has agency contracts with some 
5, 000 agents throughout the country, only six of whom have writ· 
ten authority to bind AOA and its insurers on aviation policies 
without the prior approval of AOA. (Tr., p. 643). On February 
14, 1968, Ranger through AOA executed an agency agreement with 
LeRoy and Donald Dyson, dba L.F. Dyson and Associates by which 
the Dysons were appointed "agent" of Ranger for aviation haz-
ards only. (Tr., p. 374; Ex. 2D). The agreement, among other 
things, contained the following provision: 
"Nothing herein shall be construed as au-
thorizing the agent to commit or bind the 
company to any liability without the prior 
approval of Aviation Office of America, Inc." 
(Ex. 2D). 
"The agency agreement remained in force throughout the 
period relating to this case. On December 30, 1974, Ranger 
through AOA entered into an agency agreement with Aviation Gen-
eral Agency (hereinafter called AGA) of Cody, Wyoming, appoint-
ing AGA as an agent with authority to bind AOA and represented 
insurance companies on •business and pleasure' risks, but with 
no authority to bind on 'limited commercial' risks, within the 
stated limits of coverage. Dyson was advised of the availa-
-4-
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bility of AGA as an agency authorized to act for AOA. 
pp. 3 3 6, 57 3-5 7 4) . 
(Tr., 
"In March, 1975, Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, McClain, and 
Oborn orally agreed to purchase the Cessna plane in question 
as equal partners for $27,000. (Tr., p. 765). They borrowed 
the full amount of the purchase price from Walker Bank & Trust 
Company on March 18, 1975, and jointly signed a promissory note, 
on which they each became jointly and severally liable, for the 
face amount of $38,519.88 (Interest rate of 10.58%) payable in 
84 successive monthly installments of $458.57 each commencing 
April 2 5, 19 7 5. (Ex. 36P). The note was secured by a security 
agreement on the plane. At the time of the transaction Walker 
Bank stated that the plane must be fully insured. (Tr., pp. 
361, 382, 766-767). Donald Dyson agreed with his other four 
partners that he would take care of obtaining the required in-
surance coverage on the plane, it being known by his said four 
partners that he was then in the insurance business as an in-
surance agent, and he then knew that they were relying upon him 
to do so. At the trial the Dysons acknowledged that Donald Dy-
son had a duty to obtain the required insurance coverage. (Tr., 
pp. 346-347, 355, 767). At this time only Donald Dyson was a 
licensed pilot and it was the intent of the other four partners 
to learn to fly the plane and to be licensed therefor. (Tr., 
pp. 383, 768-769). 
"Donald Dyson then had prepared, and he signed, an 'applica-
-5-
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tion' for aircraft insurance on an AOA form, requesting in-
surance on the Cessna plane with a liability coverage of 
$27,000 on the plane for all risks while in motion. (Tr., p. 
384; Ex. 4DD). The application showed only Donald A. Dyson 
as the insured, marking it as an 'individual' ownership rather 
than a 'partnership' ownership. In Section 7 of the applica-
tion it named Donald A. Dyson and Jim Breeze, an FAA Examiner, 
as pilots with 'additional pilots to be added as they quali-
fy'. Walker Bank was shown as mortgagee. (Ex. 4DD). 
"On March 22, 1975, Mary Jane Cartwright, an employee of 
Dyson, forwarded the written application to 'Aviation Office 
of America, P.O. Box 7, Cody, Wyoming,' which was the address 
of AGA. It stated that an application 'to be effective 3/21/75 
covering a 1968 Cessna for Donald A. Dyson' was enclosed, re-
questing a policy at the earliest convenience, stating the 
purpose was 'pleasure' and suggesting language for the pilot 
clause. (Ex. 23DA). 
"On March 26, 1975, AGA issued binder 1020 confirming it 
had bound with AOA insurance coverage on the plane for 30 days 
effective March 26, 1975. (Tr., p. 628; Ex. 24DA). Based upon 
said application, policy No. AC Al-198882 was issued by Ranger 
to Donald Dyson as the named insured, under date of April 1, 
1975, and effective from March 26, 1975 to March 26, 1976. (Ex. 
3DA). The total premium was stated as $748.00 with $400.00 
thereof being charged for the $27,000 liability for all risks 
-6-
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while in motion. (Ex. 3DA; Ex. 5DD). The pilot clause pro-
vided that 'Only the following pilot or pilots holding valid 
and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as 
required by FAA for the flight involved will fly the craft'. 
(Ex. 3DA). Then followed the names Donald A. Dyson or Jim 
Breeze (together with private or commercial pilots with a mini-
mum number of logged hours which phrase admittedly did not co-
ver any of the parties here involved) • (Ex. 3DA). 
"The policy contained a provision in paragraph 19 thereof 
which provided as follows: ' .•• nor shall the terms of this 
policy be waived or changed, except by improved (sic) endorse-
ment issued to form a part of this policy, signed by the au-
thorized company representative'. (Ex. 3DA). 
"In April, 1975, the premium due on the policy was billed 
to L.F. Dyson and Associates by AGA. (Ex. 5DD). 
"Mary Jane Cartwright handled the processing of insurance 
for the Dyson agency and Donald Dyson had nothing to do with 
contacting AOA or Ranger on the policy. (Tr., p. 384). 
"The first steps to effecting a change in the policy oc-
curred on July 21, 1975, when a request was made of AGA by Cart-
wright to add plaintiff Kesler as a pilot to be covered. (Tr., 
pp. 628, 671). Cartwright did not recall how her contact with 
AGA was made to initiate this change (Tr., pp. 428-429) but on 
that date AGA through David Brannon sent a handwritten communi-
cation to Tom Dougherty at AOA 'confirming our telcon of today' 
-7-
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and stating effective '7-22', AOA was to change use to in-
clude rental and also adding Stephen Kesler as a named pilot 
and stating liability premium was increased $21.00 and the Hull 
coverage by $203.00. (Ex. 7DD). 
"Also on July 21, 1975, Cartwright typed a written note 
to Dave Brannon in Cody saying, 'Sorry--change signals again' 
and telling him to delete the earlier request to cover rental 
of the plane commercially. (Ex. 8DD). She then stated it was 
necessary to change the pilot clause to include Kesler, stat-
ing some facts about his experience, saying the $21.00 increase 
had been quoted to him and concluding by saying 'Please send us 
an endorsement adding him as a pilot'. (Ex. BOD). 
"By a memo dated August 20, 1975, from the AOA office in 
Beaumont, Texas, to L.F. Dyson and Associates a request was 
made to forward pilot information on Kesler as AOA needed to 
know specific information 'before we can add as approved pilot'. 
(Ex. 9DD). 
"On August 26, 1975, Cartwright wrote Brannon at AGA in 
Cody requesting addition of Tim Bissell as a pilot and also 
stating therein that 'we had previously requested that you add 
Stephen Kesler, however we have not received any confirmation 
from you that these are being added. We would appreciate a 
note to that effect for our file.' (Ex. 6DD). This was received 
in the AGA office on August 28, 1975, and on a copy thereof, un-
-8-
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der date of September 24, 1975, Sara Broughton of AOA in Texas 
wrote 'before we can approve above pilot please have the at-
tached pilot form completed by Tim Bissell.' (Ex. 12DD). 
"On September 9, 1975, Tom Dougherty made a written re-
cord of a telephone conversation he had with 'Dyson' request-
ing a change of use to limited commercial and to add two pilots, 
Bissell and Kesler. (Tr., pp. 588-589; Ex. 28DD). 
"On September 17, 1975, the AOA office in Texas sent a 
communication to L.F. Dyson and Associates requesting advice 
as to Bissell's first name so he could be added as a named pi-
lot and stating that an endorsement adding Kesler as pilot and 
changing use to limited commercial was then being typed. (Ex. 
lODD). That endorsement was issued, dated September 17, 1975, 
showing Kesler as an added pilot and the purpose of use as 
'limited commercial' with a total additional premium of $302.00 
with the effective date of the endorsement being July 22, 1975, 
which was the date, as noted above, that it had been agreed by 
Dougherty (AOA) in his telephone communication with Brannon 
(AGA) on July 21, 1975, would be the effective date for adding 
coverage on Kesler as a pilot. (Ex. llD). 
"The requested pilot experience form, undated, was filled 
out, signed by Bissell, (Ex. 13DD) and submitted so that an en-
dorsement was issued December 2, 1975, by AOA for Ranger amend-
ing Item 7 of the policy to add 'Torn Bissell'. (Ex. 14DD) • 
-9-
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The effective date of this endorsement was November 13, 1975, 
which was the date the pilot information sheet was forwarded 
to AOA in Dallas by Cartwright on Bissell. (Tr., p. 583; Ex. 
14DD). No additional premium was required on Bissell. 
p. 630). 
(Tr., 
"As noted supra, McClain had sold his interest to Walker 
and Oborn had sold to Ferguson under a contract dated October 
15, 1975, in which Ferguson agreed to pay Oborn's share of the 
amount due Walker Bank. (Tr., p. 395; Ex. lPP). 
"After the contract of sale to Ferguson on November 5, 
1975, Mary Jane Cartwright sent a memorandum to AOA, but ad-
dressed it to P.O. Box 7 in Cody, Wyoming, stating they had 
another name to add to the policy - Gary Ferguson - and for thj 
they needed additional pilot information forms to be completed 
and requested a small supply for Dyson's use. (Ex. 20DA). 
Brannon at AGA replied to this by directing that they 'use Iterr 
#7 of the regular application.' (Ex. 22DA). 
"On November 13, 1975, in Cartwright's memorandum to AOA 
in Dallas enclosing Bissell's pilot information sheet (men-
tioned supra), she also requested more pilot information forms 
'as we have another commercial pilot to be added to this pol-
icy'. (Ex. 26DA). 
"Thereafter, Mary Jane Cartwright forwarded on December 4, 
1975, a memorandum to AOA in Dallas, Texas, enclosing a pilot's 
-10-
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statement on Ferguson, requested that Breeze be deleted, re-
quested a confirming memo and stated that since Ferguson had 
so many hours, it was doubtful the rate would be affected. (Ex. 
lSDD). Under date of December 10, 1975, AOA issued an endorse-
ment effective December 4, 1975, amending Item 7 to show Bis-
sell, Dyson, Kesler and Ferguson as the pilots covered. (Ex. 
16DD). No change in premium resulted. (Tr., p. 630). 
"Also, about December 1, 1975, Dyson sold his interest 
in the plane to Kenneth Richard Shannon on a contract under 
which Shannon agreed to as'surne Dyson's obligation to Walker 
Bank. (Tr., pp. 396, 400). Dyson's partners in the plane 
voiced concern about Shannon's qualifications and ability, but 
he made some inquiry, advised them he was licensed by FAA and 
experienced and assured them they were protected in their in-
vestment by insurance coverage. (Tr., pp. 400, 750). However, 
Dyson did not advise either AOA or AGA of the sale of his owner-
ship interest to Shannon nor did he request any change in the 
policy. (Tr., p. 392). He only told Mary Jane Cartwright to 
take the necessary steps to get Shannon's name added to the po-
licy as a pilot. (Tr., p. 416). Dyson did not tell Cartwright 
to have his own name dropped as a pilot or as the insured nor 
did he tell her he had sold his interest in the plane to Shannon. 
(Tr., pp. 403, 416). Dyson either gave Shannon a key to the 
Plane or left it with Cartwright for Shannon to pick up (Tr., 
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pp. 402, 554) although Cartwright had no recollection that 
she received the key from Dyson or gave it to Shannon. (Tr., 
p. 761). 
"Thereafter, on December 8, 1975, Cartwright forwarded 
an office memorandum to AOA in Dallas, Texas, enclosing a pi-
lot experience form on Shannon stating he was to be included 
as a pilot under the policy and requesting an endorsement to 
this effect. (Ex. 17DD). This communication was received by 
AOA in Dallas, and on December 15, 1975, Sara Broughton, an 
employee of AOA whose underwriting duty it was to make changes 
in existing policies, wrote in reply thereto the following: 
"This risk has reached a flying club ex-
posure. To add this pilot it will be a 
fully earned premium of $100. Please advise 
if you want him added." (Ex. 34DA). 
"In a deposition taken in Dallas, Texas on September 13, 
1977, Sara Broughton testified she mailed this response to the 
Dyson agency. (Tr., p. 740). Mary Jane Cartwright denied 
ever seeing this response or having received it in the mail. 
(Tr., p. 441). Dyson too denied ever having received or seeing 
it. Thus, no further written communication was sent in response 
thereto and no endorsement adding Shannon's name was ever is-
sued by AOA. (Tr., pp. 632, 634). Cartwright testified that 
in talking to Torn Dougherty in connection with a file on one 
Don Rich on December 16, 1975, she asked him about the endorse-
ment on Shannon, stating he said he would look into it. (Tr., 
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p. 442). Dougherty did not personally recall this telephone 
conversation with Cartwright but did not deny having it as his 
file on Rich contained notes of a telephone call from Cartwright 
on December 16, 1975, but they contained no reference to Shannon. 
(Tr., pp. 598-599, 635). If Dougherty received this call and 
did in fact look into it, a reasonable inference is that he 
would have seen Broughton's reply of December 15, 1975, set out 
above and may reasonably have assumed Cartwright would be re-
ceiving it shortly. Cartwright also testified she recalled 
asking Dougherty about the Shannon endorsement in talking to 
him on a policy for one Dick Reynolds. (Tr., p. 441). However, 
Dougherty's file on Reynolds shows his policy was not effective 
until November 15, 1976, some 10-1/2 months after the plane 
crashed on February 1, 1976. (Tr., p. 635). 
"The crash occurred on that date with Shannon at the con-
trols and flying it. (Ex. 18DD). As noted, the plane was to-
tally wrecked. A notation on a claim form dated February 2, 
1976, indicated the accident occurred because while landing, the 
runway was missed, and the plane hit power lines and crashed. 
(Ex. 18DD). It appears Shannon's wife and two children were in-
jured in the crash and hospitalized as a result thereof. (Ex. 
l8DD) . 
"On February 15, 1976, Cartwright wrote a letter to Dough-
erty at AOA enclosing a copy of the Dyson memo 'dated December 
7, 197 5' (actually dated December 8) wherein 'we requested that 
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you add Kennet!:J. Sh.ar.ncn as a :::i.lc-: -:c :.::.e a:::c·:e ca:;::..:.c:-.e::. :;:c-
licy in the name o= ~r. Dyson.' 
"She further stated: 
ing memo or endorsement to the :::o.:.ic·:. 
sold his interest in the craft to :·!r. Sha."l!".o:-.. iie · .. ·c·..:.:.:=. a:;:;::re-
ciate an endorsement at your earliest convenience', addin~ a 
postscript 'Perhaps this request !l.i-: your of=.:.ce ·..-:::en :.,.·o;.: ·,.;ere 
in the process of moving and thus t!l.e dela::·. ~,·e ·..;cu.:.:: ap:;:re-
ciate the endorsement.' (Ex. 19DD). 
•The move by AOA from Beaumont to Dallas :::ad in =ac:. :::ea~ 
made in the summer of 1975. ( Tr. , p. 6 2 5) • 
"Dougherty replied on March 1, 1976, noting that ·~e guo-
ted the amount of premium required to add pilot but did not 
receive a response'. (Ex. 30). He also said it was not cus-
tomery (sic) to assign policies and advance approval of the 
company would be needed. (Ex. 30). Dougherty's files also 
contained notations dated March 1, 1976 of a telephone call 
with Tom Lehman (manager) General Adjustment Bureau, Albuquer-
que, New Mexico) (sic) in which he recorded that they did not 
add the pilot because they had 'no reply to Sara B's 12/15 me-
mo'. (Ex. 31). 
"It was stipulated that the proof of loss or claim re-
quired under the policy had been duly filed. (Tr., p. 756; Ex. 
37). 
"By letter dated March 30, 1976, to Donald A. Dyson, Torn 
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l 
Lehman advised that he regretted to advise him that there was 
no coverage under the policy for the claims arising out of 
the accident as Shannon was not a named pilot under the terms 
of the policy nor did he qualify under the open pilot endorse-
ment. (Ex. 38). It further stated that Dyson had warranted 
under the application for aircraft insurance that he was the 
sole owner, but that the records of the FAA and their own fur-
ther investigation indicated this information was incorrect. 
(Ex.38)." 
Based upon these findings a judgment was entered in fa-
vor of the plaintiff owners against Dyson personally and against 
the L.F. Dyson Agency in the amount of $27,000. The Court ruled 
against Plaintiffs' claim towards A.O.A. and Ranger, gave judg-
ment in favor of A.O.A. and Ranger against Dyson, and ruled 
against Dyson and the agency as to all claims. (R. I pp. 284-
286). It is from this judgment that this appeal is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DYSON AGENCY WAS LIMITED BY THE CLEAR 
TERMS OF THE AGENCY AGREEMENT WITH RANGER 
INSURANCE COMPANY AND CANNOT CLAIM IT HAD 
EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED BINDING AUTHOR-
ITY TO INSURE SHANNON. 
A. It is Undisputed That Shannon was Never Expressly 
Covered Under the Airplane Policy. 
The Ranger Insurance policy issued in March of 1975 did 
not include Kenneth R. Shannon as a named pilot. (Ex. 3DA). 
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Shannon did not qualify under the open-pilot provision in the 
policy since he did not have 100 hours in multi-engine air-
craft nor 10 hours in the insured aircraft. (Ex. 3DA; 17DD). 
The trial court found that it was "appaient that no written 
endorsement approving the addition of the name of Shannon as 
a pilot to Item 7 of the policy was ever issued." (R., p. 260; 
App., p. A-17). The last endorsement to the policy dated De-
cember 4, 1975 named Tom Bissell, Donald A. Dyson, Stephen 
Kesler, or Gary Ferguson as pilots (Ex. 16DD). Shannon was 
never listed as a pilot in any subsequent endorsements. 
It is undisputed that the Dyson Agency never requested an 
oral binder to cover Shannon. (Tr., p. 475). The only means 
of requesting coverage was done through the memo dated Decem-
ber 8, 1975 enclosing a pilot experience form for Shannon and 
requesting his endorsement as a pilot. (Ex. 17DD). While Dy-
son claimed he never received a reply to his December 8 request, 
the files of the insurance company show that a reply was made 
on December 15, 1975 by Sara Broughton, an underwriter for A.O.A. 
stating the following: 
This risk has reached a flying club expo-
sure. To add this pilot it will be a fully-
earned premium of $100. Please advise if 
you want him added. (Ex. 34DA). 
Thus, the last known communication from the company requested 
Dyson to give his approval as to the new status of the policy 
and to the additional premium. There was clearly no express 
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acceptance of Shannon as a risk and this fact would not have 
changed even if Dyson admitted receiving the reply message. 
For these reasons, if Dyson is to recover in this lawsuit 
he must show coverage by implication rather than by express 
agreement. The trial court correctly held that such a showing 
was not made. 
B. The Dyson Agency Did Not Have Express Nor Implied 
Authority to Bind the Company to Insure Shannon. 
The agency agreement entered into between Ranger Insurance 
Company and the L.F. Dyson and Associates Agency dated February 
14, 1968 specifically stated the following: 
Nothing herein shall be construed as au-
thorizing the agent to commit or bind the 
company to any liability without the prior 
approval of Aviation Office of America, 
Inc. (Ex. 2DD) • 
The language contained in the agency agreement is clear 
and unambiguous. The terms clearly state that Dyson has no au-
thority to bind any risk without the express approval of A.O.A. 
Dyson admitted that he was not aware of any written or 
oral agreement from Ranger Insurance Company altering this ex-
press limitation in the agency contract. ( Tr • , pp • 3 8 5-3 8 6 l • 
Similarly, Mrs. Cartwright of the Dyson Agency stated that 
she always assumed it was necessary for A.O.A. or A.G.A. to ap-
prove a risk and that she never assumed that she could do this 
herself. (Tr., p. 44). She also believed that A.O.A. could 
always reject an application if it did not wish to assume the 
risk. (Tr., p. 486). In addition, Mrs. Cartwright admitted 
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that as a regular procedure in almost all instances when there 
was going to be a material change in a risk on a policy she 
would call A.O.A. and obtain an oral binder and then follow up 
that conversation with a memorandum. (Tr., p. 497). 
Thus, Dyson and his chief employee at the time of the 
coverage in question both admitted that they never considered 
themselves to have the power to bind the company but always 
sought specific approval as provided in the agency agreement. 
Dyson attempts to circumvent the failure to have either an 
express endorsement of Shannon by the company or an express 
authorization to bind the company by claiming that the company 
impliedly gave Dyson binding authority because of its alleged 
practice of backdating policies. 
Dyson, in his brief makes the following statement: 
As an abstract principle, respondents do not 
seriously contend the proposition that if an 
insurance company adopts the practice of 
backdating endorsements for additional in-
surance coverage to the dates that the soli-
citing agents requested the coverages, that 
the company has in fact impliedly extended 
binding authority to the agent. Rather, re-
spondents deny that they adopted such a prac-
tice. (Appellants' brief, p. lll. 
This statement purporting to present Respondents' position 
in this case is grossly erroneous. It is difficult to imagine 
how Appellants could make such a statement in light of Respon-
dents' consistent position throughout the trial court proceed-
ings. Respondents have always contended that course of conduct 
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cannot alter an unambiguous express agreement. (Tr., pp. 
375-3771 458-459, 683-684!. 
Respondents argued throughout the trial that (1) course 
of conduct and custom cannot vary an unambiguous agency con-
tract, and (2) there was no evidence showing a course of con-
duct existed between Dyson and Ranger Insurance Company which 
would have in any way affected the policy in this case. This 
second argument will be discussed in detail in Point II of this 
brief infra. 
The law is overwhelmingly consistent that custom, usage, 
or course of conduct cannot be used to vary the terms of an 
express agreement unless the terms of the agreement are unarn-
biguous an~ subject to interpretation. 
A brief review of the authorities will illustrate this 
point. The rule as to the liability of an insurance agent to 
his company for issuance of a policy beyond his express au-
thority is as follows: 
Where the instructions are clear, precise, 
and imperative, they should be followed 
strictly and exactly, and a violation of 
definite instructions cannot be excused by 
a custom or a usage in the business. More 
specifically, an insurance agent should 
confine his acts to the scope of his actual 
authority, and although he may, within his 
apparent or ostensible authority, bind the 
insurer to risks which his instructions 
forbid him to assume, he is liable to the 
company if he issues a policy in violation 
of his instructions and thereby subjects 
the company to a liability which it has for-
bidden him to assume for it. Annot. "Lia-
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bility of Insurance Agent, for Exposure 
of Insurer to Liability, Because of Is-
suance of Policy Beyond Authority or Con-
trary to Instructions," 35 A.L.R.3d 907, 
912 (Emphasis added) . 
Another leading authority has stated the rule regarding 
custom as follows: 
It has been held that the courts should 
not resort too freely to custom or usage 
to control the true intention of the par-
ties, and such evidence is not admissible 
to vary the terms of an unambiguous con-
tract, nor is it admissible where the terms 
of the contract exclude the usage .••. 
The true test of admissibility is whether 
there is in the contract something doubt-
ful which can be explained by usage, and, 
if the contract is plain and unambiguous, 
evidence of custom is inadmissible to vary 
or contradict it. 
* * * 
Further, evidence of a usage is not admis-
sible where an agent's, factor's or bro-
ker's contract is clear and unambiguous as 
to his duties or his compensation, and so, 
where a principal has given express instruc-
tions, usage will not justify or excuse a 
departure therefrom. 25 C.J.S., Customs 
and Usages, Sections 21-30. (Emphasis add-
ed). 
Utah statutory law follows this rule. Section 70A-l-205, 
U.C.A. states the following: 
The express terms of an agreement and an 
applicable course of dealing or usage of 
trade shall be construed whenever reasonable 
as consistent with each other; but when such 
construction is unreasonable express terms 
control both course of dealing and usage of 
trade. (Emphasis added). 
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This Court in Barnett v. State Automobile and Casualty 
Underwriters, 487 P.2d 311 (Utah 1971) also recognized this 
principle and quoted numerous authorities holding that trade 
custom or usage is not admissible where there is no ambiguity 
in the contract. This Court concluded that an insurance con-
tract expiration date was clear and unambiguous and that it 
was error to instruct that custom of the agency could vary the 
date. 
In Barnett the action was between an insured and the in-
surance company; the effect of the decision was to deny any 
coverage to the insured because of his reliance upon the cus-
tom and usage of his agent. In this case, however, the insured 
plaintiffs admit to not having relied upon any course of con-
duct with Ranger. (Tr., pp. 357-358). Besides, they have 
been given full judgment against Dyson on the basis of Dyson's 
failure to provide insurance coverage. Therefore, the instant 
case does not involve the equities and hardships found in Bar-
nett since the agreement being litigated is that between the 
insurance company and its own agent. Certainly, an agent should 
be bound by the express terms of his agency contract if an in-
sured, as in Barnett, is held to the terms of the insurance con-
tract even though the insured's reliance on his agent caused 
him to suffer a loss. 
This Court in Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 
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221 lUtah 1958) stated the following rule for interpretation 
of contracts: 
Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty 
in the language so that the meani~g is 
confused, or is susceptible of more than 
one meaning, there is no justification 
for interpretation or explanation from ex-
traneous sources. It would defeat the 
very purpose of formal contracts to per-
mit a party to invoke the use of words or 
conduct inconsistent with its terms to 
prove that the parties did not mean what 
they said, or to use such inconsistent 
words or conduct to demonstrate uncertain-
ty or ambiguity where none would otherwise 
exist. Id. at 223. 
See also Mason v. Tooele City, 484 P.2d 153 (Utah 1971); Martin 
v. Christensen, 454 P.2d 294 (Utah 1969); and Pulsipher v. 
Tolboe, 370 P.2d 360 (Utah 1962). 
Courts in every jurisdiction recognize the rule that cus-
tom, usage, and course of dealings cannot vary the terms of an 
express agreement. See Corbin-Dykes Electric Company v. Burr, 
500 P.2d 632 (Ariz. 1972); Williams v. Elliott, 273 P.2d 953 
(Cal. 1954); Bassett Construction Co. v. Schmitz Painting Con-
tractors, 533 P.2d 503 (Colo. 1975); Puget Sound National Bank 
v. C.B. Lauch Construction Company, 245 P.2d 800 (Ida. 1952); 
Rachou v. McQuitty, 229 P.2d 965 (Mont. 1951); Asbury Trans-
portation v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation, 501 P.2d 321 
(Or. 1972); and S.L. Rowland Construction Company v. Beall Pipe 
and Tank Corporation, 540 P.2d 912 (Wash. 1975). 
In this case Dyson claims that the company consistently 
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l 
"backdated" insurance policies to the date of application ra-
ther than the date of acceptance and that this alleged practice 
therefore impliedly gave Dyson binding authority from the time 
of application to the time of acceptance or rejection of the 
risk by the company. This argument, of course, flies directly 
in conflict with the express provision in the agency agreement 
stating that Dyson had no binding authority. Thus, Dyson's 
position is directly contradicted by all legal authorities in-
eluding numerous decisions from this Court. 
It should be noted at this point, that this is not a case 
where a policy date is in question such as where a loss occurred 
prior to the acceptance of the risk by the company. In this 
case there was never an acceptance of the risk by the company 
at any time. Dyson is therefore attempting to impute binding 
authority on the insurance agency in order that the company 
which never accepted the risk will be responsible for the darn-
age. 
C. The Traveler's Case Relied Upon by Appellants is Dis-
tinguishable As To Its Facts From the Instant Case. 
Dyson's only authority for his unorthodox position is the 
New Jersey Traveler's Insurance Company case cited extensively 
in Appellants' brief. (Appellants' brief, pp. 11-16). This 
case, however, is not only directly contrary to the numerous 
authorities cited above including this Court's own decisions but 
is clearly distinguishable upon its facts. 
Lewis v. Traveler's Insurance Company, 239 A.2d 4 (N.J. 
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1968) is the only case cited by Appellants both at the time of 
trial and in this Court standing for the proposition that as 
between an insurance agent and his company the agency agree-
ment may not always be controlling. Respondents believe that 
this is the only case in the nation in which the clear rule that 
conduct cannot alter the express terms of a contract is not 
scrupulously adhered to. 
Respondents have no quarrel with the holding in Traveler's 
based upon its own facts since the facts in the Traveler's 
case are dramatically different from the facts in the instant 
case and, for this reason, the case is not persuasive even as 
a minority position. 
The Traveler's case involved an action by an insured who 
sued both his insurance agent and Traveler's Insurance Company. 
The agent had expressly given the insured an oral binder of co-
verage before the loss occurred. The court awarded a judgment 
to the plaintiff against Traveler's on the basis that the agent 
had apparent authority to act for Traveler's and that the in-
sured justifiably relied upon the agent's representation. 
The trial court ruled in favor of Traveler's against the 
agent holding that the agent acted without actual authority to 
bind the company and therefore had to indemnify Traveler's for 
the amount of the loss paid to the insured. The Appellate 
Court reversed. 
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The following is an analysis of the New Jersey Court's 
opinion in the Traveler's Case as contrasted with the facts 
in the instant case. The Traveler's case is distinguishable 
from the instant case in the following respects: 
1. In Traveler's the agent alleged that a letter 
he had received from the company stating the company would fur-
nish him with necessary binding authority expressly modified 
the contract provision. In this case, Dyson denies that any 
express binder or modification was ever communicated to him. 
( Tr. , p. 3 6 8) • 
2. In Traveler's the agent testified that he was 
led by the practice of backdating to believe that he was ac-
tually authorized to bind the risk while the company considered 
the application and consequently he expressly gave an oral bind-
er to the insured. In this case, however, no binder was ever 
~ssued by Dyson to the plaintiff nor did Dyson ever think he 
~.ad bi.'1ding authority. (Tr., pp. 385-386, 484-486). In addi-
:1on, it was undisputed that while A.O.A. has 5,000 agents 
:~~oughout the country soliciting insurance,only six have bind-
~::~ authority. ( Tr . , p. 6 4 3) • It was for this reason that the 
::;sor. a:;er:cy ·,.;ould routine!:: call A.O .A. for an oral binder if 
~ ::a:erial risk c:-.a.'1ge was occurring. ( Tr. , p. 4 9 7) • 
3. The court ~'1 Traveler's i.'nplied that the ex-
;:ess 3.',.1-:::crizat:..cr. :::..?e..--: ":o t.:-.e agent ·..;as ambiguous and that 
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the agent had the authority to act in accordance "with W'hat 
he reasonably believes to be the wish of the principal even 
though it is contrary to the principal's actual intent." 239 
A.2d at 8. In this case, however, there was no finding nor 
even a claim that Dyson's agency agreement was ambiguous or 
that subsequent writings had in any way modified the original 
agreement. Dyson agreed that the agreement was not ambiguous. 
(Tr., p. 385). 
4. The Supreme Court of New Jersey was concerned 
with the practice of Traveler's Insurance in accepting a pre-
mium for a backdated policy from the time of the backdating 
even though the policy had been accepted by the company at a 
later date. The court stated: 
[T]he application would hold the interim 
risk if Traveler's should reject the appli-
cation after a loss, while Traveler's, if 
it issued the policy, would obtain a full 
premium for the period during which it held 
the option to accept or reject the applica-
tion even though at the time of acceptance 
Traveler's knew there had been no loss and 
of course no risk. Id. at 7. 
In the instant case the evidence was consistent that any back-
dating only occurred when no additional premium was involved. 
In other words, the company would backdate applications of addi-
tional pilots as long as no new risk requiring a greater pre-
mium was involved. If, however, the risk increased then the 
company required that the agent approve the increased premium 
and did not issue coverage until it received the agent's appro-
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val. (Tr., pp. 630-631; 704-707). In other instances oral 
binders were given and both coverage and premiums took effect. 
Thus, unlike the Traveler's Insurance Company, Ranger Insur-
ance did not "have its cake and eat it too" by charging an 
insured a premium for a period of time which had already passed 
at the time the risk was accepted. 
5. The Traveler's decision was based upon conduct 
in which 300 identical cases of backdating new coverage were 
accepted by the company without a single exception. In the 
instant case, Dyson failed to show a single instance where 
Ranger backdated policies on new risks, let alone a "course 
of conduct". The proof relied upon by Dyson as to this issue 
consists of approximately 10 transactions with Ranger Insur-
ance Company but even those are clearly distinguishable. They 
consisted of renewals, renewal policies, new business policies, 
~dorsements, changing of aircraft, changing pilots, adding 
pilots, and changing uses. (Tr., p. 639). These policies were 
issued from the inception of the agency in 1968. (Ex. 2DD). 
Such a small number of divergent and differing types of cover-
age amply justifies the trial court's conclusion that "The 
thread which Dysons seek to grasp to support their contention 
that a course of dealing was established does not run through 
the policy cases upon which evidence was given." (Tr., p. 261; 
App., p. A-19). A more thorough examination of this evidence 
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will be made in Point II of this brief infra. 
6. The court in Traveler's circumvented the express 
agreement in the agency contract by stating that such agreement 
could always be modified by conduct or a new understanding. 
239 A.2d at 9. While it is true that parties can always modi-
fy a written agreement as this Court has held in the cases cited 
in Appellants' brief (Appellants' brief, pp. 18-19) the theory 
of modification cannot apply in this case. First, modification 
has never been plead or raised by Appellants in the lower court 
and under Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P. cannot now be raised. Second, 
and more importantly, Dyson himself admitted that there was 
neither oral nor written communication from the company chang-
ing his binding authority. (Tr., pp. 385-386). Thus, the tra-
ditional express modification of a written agreement that is 
found in those cases cited by Appellants does not exist in the 
instant case nor was there a showing that any new consideration 
was given for a modification. 
It should also be noted that in Traveler's much of the 
language and many of the authorities cited by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court concerned cases involving apparent authority of 
agents as affecting an insurance applicant. The authorities 
are uniform that an insurance company may be bound to insure an 
applicant if its agent misleads the applicant into believing 
that the agent has bound a risk. The courts hold that under 
the doctrine of apparent authority a company is liable for the 
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actions of its agent when it appears to innocent third parties 
that the agent has the authority to bind the company, even if 
the agent in fact does not. 
This Court in numerous cases has held that the doctrine 
of apparent or ostensible authority is applicable to third par-
ties if the principal allows his agent to be placed in a posi-
tion where the third party appears to have authority to act for 
the principal. Santi v. Denver & Rio Grande Railway, 442 P.2d 
921 (Utah 1968); Malia v. Moulton, 114 P.2d 208 (Utah 1941). 
However, the situation involving innocent third-party ap-
plicants is far different from an action between the insurance 
company and its agent. In such a case the agent knows the ex-
tent of his authority and cannot claim that he was mislead by 
the principal. 
For these reasons, as a matter of law, the trial court was 
correct in finding that the express provisions of the contract 
controlled and that therefore coverage was not afforded to the 
Shannon pilot risk at the time of the accident. 
POINT II 
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT COURSE OF 
CONDUCT WAS RELEVANT, THERE WAS NO EVI-
DENCE SHOWING THAT A COURSE OF CONDUCT 
EXISTED BETWEEN DYSON AND RANGER WHICH 
COULD HAVE IN ANY WAY AFFECTED THE COVER-
AGE IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
Even if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that course 
of conduct evidence is relevant, an examination of the record re-
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veals that no custom or course of conduct existed under any 
standard, which would require Ranger Insurance Company to in-
sure Shannon in the operation of the airplane. 
A. The Burden is on the Appellants to Establish a Course 
of Conduct. 
If Appellants are to rely upon a course of conduct or 
custom with the insurance company they must present clear evi-
dence to establish it. The burden of proof rests with the ap-
pellants. A custom or course of conduct must be clearly provec 
Where the evidence is uncertain and contradictory the custom is 
not established. 25 C.J.S., Customs and Usages, Section 33, p. 
128. 
In order to be relevant to a particular instance, the 
course of conduct relied upon must consist of the same or simi-
lar facts and circumstances. Evidence of conduct in a particu-
lar situation or in a few instances is not sufficient to es-
tablish custom. Hercules Powder Company v. Automatic Sprin-
kler Corporation of America, 311 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. Cal. 1957). 
Appellants have failed to meet this burden and the trial 
court properly ruled that no course of conduct had been esta-
blished. 
B. The Instances Relied upon by Appellants as to this 
Aircraft Pol~cy and Other Pol~c~es Do Not Show a Course of Con-
duct and are Not Analogous to the R~sk Involved ~n the Instant 
Case. 
Appellants' theory throughout this proceeding has been 
that when an insurance company adopts the practice of backdatir 
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endorsements for a change in insurance coverage to the dates 
that the soliciting agent requested the coverage, that the com-
pany has impliedly extended binding authority to the agent. 
(Appellants' brief, p. 11). Under Appellants' theory, this 
implied extension of authority can be used not only by the 
third-party insurance applicant but also by the insurance agent 
himself. 
The trial court rejected a finding of such a course of con-
duct. The court stated: 
In support of these contentions counsel 
points to the course of dealing on the 
policy in question as well as in the issu-
ance of six other policies about which 
testimony was given. I have considered 
the testimony with respect to those other 
policies and do not find the facts sup-
port counsel's contention that a course 
of dealing was established from which it 
can be found that coverage was binding 
upon submission of the pilot information 
and request for the change. The facts of 
each policy so issued varies and the ef-
fective date of the coverage granted on 
those policies was not tied solely to re-
ceipt of completed pilot information forms. 
Some of the policies relied on to show 
such course of dealing did not deal with 
adding pilots to policies and in some the 
effective date was made in conformity with 
a specific request for making the effec-
tive date that of a specific date. The 
thread which Dysons seek to grasp to sup-
port their contention that a course of 
deal~ng was establ~shed does not run through 
all of the policy cases upon which evidence 
was g~ven. (Emphas~s added) (R., p. 261; 
App. pp. A-18 - A-19). 
During the trial Dyson relied upon two alleged courses of 
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conduct in support of his theory of implied binding authority. 
The first group consisted of the transactions occurring to the 
Dyson policy itself. The second group included other policies 
issued to various individuals and compan~es by Dyson through 
Ranger Insurance Company. 
An examination of the record will show that in all exam-
ples given, the following occurred: (1) In many instances a 
new risk had been bound orally by telephone; (2) An additional 
risk was never bound until all information was received by Ran-
ger and until the insured knew and accepted the amount of the 
premium; (3) Policy endorsements would be "backdated" only if 
no new risk was involved and no new premium was charged. This 
is in contrast to the transaction involving the addition of 
Shannon as a pilot since such did involve an additional risk 
and premium--yet no oral binder was requested or obtained nor 
did the insured accept the additional premium. The following 
synopsis supports the contentions concerning the transactions 
at issue: 
1. Transactions Involving the Dyson Policy Itself. 
a. The Issuance of the Original Policy. 
The policy involved in this litigation insuring the air-
craft which Shannon was piloting at the time of the accident 
was initiated by a call from Mary Cartwright to A.G.A. in Cody, 
Wyoming. (Tr., p. 490). Pursuant to that conversation an ap-
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plication for insurance was sent in by Mrs. Cartwrig~t to 
A.G.A. in Cody, Wyoming. (Ex. 4DD) . The application together 
with a cover memorandum were dated March 22, 1975 and requested 
that the application be effective March 21, 1975. (Ex. 23DA). 
The application was received by A.G.A. on March 26, 1975 
at which time the application was modified by Mr. Dave Brannon 
of A.G.A. who wrote in the amount of premiums, corrected the 
number of passenger seats listed, noted that an open pilot 
clause was to be included, and changed the effective date from 
March 21 to March 26. (Ex. 35DA). 
Brannon then quoted the premium to ~trs. Cartwright by 
telephone and upon approval issued a thirty-day binder. (Tr., 
pp. 712-714; Ex. 24DA). The binder was sent to A.O.A. so that 
the copy was in its office on March 31. (Tr., p. 628). 
Thus, even though the policy was typed on April 1, it was 
"backdated" to March 26 since a binder had been issued on that 
date and Ranger Insurance was therefore liable during the 30-
day interim period. The difference in the date of the typing 
and the date of the coverage was attributable to an oral and 
~itten binder issued on the date of the policy. 
b. Addition of Stephen Kesler as Pilot. 
Mary Cartwright on July 21, 1975 telephoned Dave Brannon 
at A.G.A. and requested that Stephen Kesler be added as a pilot 
~d also that the coverage be extended to commercial use. (Tr., 
PP. 428-429). Since A.G.A. did not have binding authority as 
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to commercial use (Ex. 33DA) , Brannon called Thomas Dougherty, 
Vice President in charge of underwriting of A.O.A., andre-
quested coverage. (Tr., p. 574}. Authority was given and 
Brannon then wrote a confirming memorandum dated July 21, 1975 
changing use to include rental and adding the name "Stephen 
Kesler" as a pilot. (Ex. 7DD). 
On the same date of July 21, 1975 Mary Cartwright wrote 
a memorandum to A.G.A. in Wyoming changing her request for 
commercial coverage but stating that Kesler should still be 
added as a pilot and noting that he had approved the $21 in-
crease in premium. (Ex. 8DD}. 
On August 20 a request was made from A.O.A. to Dyson for 
more pilot information on Kesler concerning his number of to-
tal hours in various types of planes. (Ex. 9DD). 
On September 9, 1975 Torn Dougherty was called by Mrs. 
Cartwright who told him that Dyson had again changed his mind 
and that commercial coverage should be added to the policy. At 
that time she was quoted what the new premium for commercial 
coverage would be. (Tr., pp. 588-589; Ex. 28DD}. On September 
17, 1975 A.O.A. advised Dyson by memo that an endorsement add-
ing Kesler and changing the policy to commercial use was being 
typed. (Ex. 10}. 
The endorsement was issued September 17, 1975 effective 
as of July 22, 1975, the date of the original binding phone 
call. (Ex. llDD). 
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The trial court correctly noted that even though the po-
licy was issued on September 17 it was made effective July 22 
because of the oral binder given by A.G.A. to Dyson. (Tr., p. 
578). The trial court stated: 
In Kesler's case the effective date of the 
risk of July 22, 1975, was based upon A.O.A.'s 
specific acceptance through Dougherty in his 
telephone call from Brannon at A.G.A. of the 
risk as to Kesler as a pilot, even though it 
took until September 17, 1975, to get there-
quired information to A.O.A. to issue the en-
dorsement. (R., p. 262; App. p. A-20) (Emphasis added). 
Thus, once again an oral binder had been issued and ac-
counted for the backdating of the policy. 
c. Addition of Tim Bissell as a Pilot. 
On August 26, 1975 Mrs. Cartwright sent a memorandum to 
Dave Brannon at A.G.A. in Cody, Wyoming requesting Tim Bissell 
be added to the policy. (Ex. 6DD). On September 17, 1975 
A.O.A. wrote to Dyson requesting Bissell's first name be pro-
vided. (Ex. lODD). 
On September 24 Sara Broughton, an assistant underwriter 
at A.O.A., wrote to Dyson on the reply portion of the August 
26 memorandum and stated the following: "Before we can approve 
the above pilot please have the attached pilot form completed 
by Tim Bissell." (Emphasis added) (Ex. 12DD). 
The Dyson Agency then forwarded a completed Pilot Exper-
ience Form to A.O.A. (Ex. 13DD; Tr., p. 670). An endorsement 
was issued on December 2, 1975 effective as of November 13, 
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1975, the date that the information was submitted to A.O.A. 
(Ex. 14DD). No additional premium was charged on Bissell's 
addition. (Tr., p. 630). 
Thus, even though the initial request in Bissell's case 
was made in August of 1975 the effective date of coverage was 
not until November 13, 1975 when all of the information had 
been submitted. In Bissell's case there had been no oral bind-
er by either A.G.A. or A.O.A. prior to the receipt of the Pi-
lot Information Form. The effective date in this case then 
was based upon the date that the last information necessary 
for completion of the risk was submitted to A.O.A. 
d. Addition of Gary Ferguson as a Pilot. 
On December 4, 1975 Mrs. Cartwright sent a memorandum 
directly to A.O.A. in Dallas, Texas enclosing a Pilot Exper-
ience Form on Ferguson, requesting that Jim Breeze be deleted 
from the policy, requesting a confirming memo on coverage, and 
stating that she did not believe that an additional rate would 
be needed because of Ferguson's experience. (Ex. 15DD). An 
endorsement was issued for December 4, 1975 showing Bissell, 
Dyson, Kesler, and Ferguson as the pilots covered. (Ex. 16DD). 
No additional risk was involved so no additional premium was 
charged. (Tr., p. 630). 
Here, as in the Bissell case, the effective date of the 
policy was related to the day that the necessary information 
for rating Ferguson as a pilot was submitted to A.O.A. Again, 
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like in Bissell, no additional premium was charged since no 
new risk was considered by the company to have occurred. lTr., 
p. 630). 
e. Addition of Kenneth Shannon as an Insured 
Pilot. 
On December 8, 1975 Mrs. Cartwright forwarded an office 
memorandum to A.O.A. in Dallas, Texas enclosing a Pilot Exper-
ience Form on Shannon stating that he was to be included as a 
pilot under the policy and requesting an endorsement to that 
effect. (Ex. 17DD). 
On December 15, 1975 Sara Broughton wrote to Dyson on the 
reply portion of the December 8 memorandum and stated the fol-
lowing: 
This risk has reached a flying club expo-
sure. To add this pilot it will be a fully 
earned premium of $100. Please advise if 
you want him added. (Ex. 34DA). 
No further written communication was made between Dyson and 
A.O.A. and no endorsement adding Shannon as a named pilot was 
ever issued. (Tr., pp. 632, 634). 
Mrs. Cartwright testified that in talking to Tom Dougherty 
in connection with a Don Rich file on December 16, 1975 she 
asked Dougherty about the endorsement on Shannon and he told 
her that he would look into it. (Tr., p. 442). Dougherty could 
not remember discussing the Shannon endorsement and his note 
showed no reference to such subject matter on the December 16 
telephone conversation. (Tr., pp. 598-599, 635). Mrs. Cart-
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wrig~t also thoug~t that she talked to Dougherty about the 
Shannon endorsement in a conversation concerning Dick Reynolds. 
(Tr., p. 441). However, the record shows that the Reynolds 
file was not effective until almost 11 months after the plane 
had crashed. (Tr., p. 635). Mrs. Cartwright must have been 
mistaken on that point. 
The trial court found the following with regard to the 
alleged conversation regarding Shannon on December 16, 1975: 
If Dougherty received this call and did in 
fact look into it, a reasonable inference 
is that he would have seen Broughton's reply 
of December 15, 1975, set out above and may 
reasonably have assumed Cartwright would be 
receiving it shortly. (R., p. 259; App., p. 
A-15) • 
The evidence shows that the following policy procedures 
were utilized by A.O.A. in determining the date of coverage: 
(1) When an oral binder of coverage was given, the company 
would charge a premium from the date of the binder and would 
insure the risk as of that time regardless of when the applica-
tion was finalized into a policy as an endorsement, (Tr., p. 
578); (2) When a new risk was added to an existing policy and 
an additional premium was required, coverage would not be ef-
fected until the additional premium had been approved by the 
agent and sufficient information was available to the under-
writer, (Tr., pp. 633, 704); and (3) If no new risk was invol-
ved and no oral binder had been given the policy would be dated 
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as of t~e time that information necessary to rate the risk had 
been submitted to A.O.A. or on the specific date requested by 
the agent--but no new premium would be charged. 
671) • 
(Tr. , pp. 611-
Applying these principles to the aforesaid examples re-
veals the following: (1) As to the original policy an oral 
binder was given and a premium was charged as of that date since 
a risk had been assumed; (2) As to Kesler and the change to com-
mercial usage an oral binder had been given by A.O.A. so that 
this became the effective date of the endorsement and included 
an additional premium since the additional risk was bound as 
of that date; (3) As to Bissell there was no oral binder issued, 
and upon receipt of the Pilot Information Form the endorsement 
was issued as of the date the form was submitted by Dyson but 
because no additional risk was incurred the company did not re-
quire a higher premium; (4) As to Ferguson no cral binder was 
made, and upon receipt of the Pilot Information Form the date of 
submission was again used since it was determined that no addi-
tional risk was incurred and therefore no additional premium 
was charged; (5) As to the addition of Shannon, no oral binder 
was requested and the information received by the company showed 
that an increased risk resulted causing an increase in premium 
which required approval of the insured before the requested en-
dorsement could be effectuated. 
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It can readily be seen from the foregoing transaction of 
this policy that Ranger Insurance Company had no regular course 
of dealing with the Dyson Agency which would have justified 
Dyson into believing that it had an impl~ed authority to bind 
coverage. In addition, unlike the insurance company in Tra-
veler's, Ranger Insurance Company received no premium advantage 
from any backdating since a premium was only charged concur-
rently when a risk was assumed. For these reasons, there was 
no evidence showing that the transactions in the policy case 
itself created a course of dealing or custom which justified 
coverage by the company. In fact, the dealings negated any in-
ference of binding authority in Dyson. Otherwise, why did Dy-
son find it necessary to obtain an oral telephone binder when 
a new risk was involved such as with the issuance of this pol-
icy and the addition of Kesler. 
2. Other Insurance Coverage Instances Relied Upon 
by Dyson as Showing a Course of Conduct. 
Dyson attempted to cite previous experiences with the com-
pany as tending to show the practice of backdating policies. 
An analysis of these cases once again shows that the instances 
were not analogous because they involved different types of co-
verage or complied with the criteria listed in the previous 
section as to when a policy would be issued and did not create 
a uniform backdating practice as found in the Traveler's case. 
a. Coverage of Rex Anderson. 
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Dyson claimed that his company requested an endorsement 
to be dated May 5, 1972 although the request was made May 22, 
197 2. (Tr., pp. 512-513). 
Mr. Dougherty, upon examination of his files, found that 
the Rex Anderson policy involved a request for substitution 
of an aircraft and that the effective date of coverage was not 
material because the policy provision allowed for a 30-day sub-
stitution clause which would have covered the airplane in any 
event. (Tr., pp. 698-699). 
b. Coverage of Norman Anderson. 
Appellants claimed that in this case Dyson requested from 
the company a broadening of the pilot clause of the policy. 
His files showed that on June 26 he wrote a letter to the com-
pany requesting that coverage be changed as of June 10, 1973. 
The company accordingly issued its policy on July 2, 1973 but 
made the coverage effective as of the requested June 10, 1973 
date. (Tr., pp. 514-515). 
Mr. Dougherty testified that the Norman Anderson case in-
volved the issuing of a new policy which was to be continued 
from the insureds previous company. After having received the 
needed information and quoting the premium the policy was typed 
with an effective date of May 31. It should have been typed 
with a date of June 10. Subsequently, Dyson wrote to the com-
pany and requested that the correct date be inserted and the 
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company accordingly corrected the time of coverage pursuant to 
their instructions. (Tr., pp. 700-701). 
c. Coverage of R. W. Walsh. 
This involved a renewal policy of a previously insured 
pilot. The policy was typed on June 22, 1976 but was made ef-
fective June 5, 1976. (Tr., pp. 517-518). 
Mr. Dougherty explained that this renewal had been tele-
phone bound on May 29 and that a request for a June 5 date had 
been made by the Dyson Agency. (Tr., p. 701). 
d. Coverage of Don Rich. 
This case involved the addition of a pilot to a policy. 
The policy was typed on April 30, 1976 and the endorsement was 
dated April 16, 1976. (Tr., p. 527). 
Mr. Dougherty testified that in the Don Rich case a tele-
phone binder had been made previous to the effective date of 
coverage and that the effective date was that requested by the 
agent. The policy was typed several weeks thereafter. 
702). 
e. Coverage of Dick Reynolds. 
(Tr., p. 
This involved a new insurance policy on a pilot. A memo 
request was dated November 15 from Dyson to A.O.A. Dyson tes-
tified that no binder was issued on that policy. He further 
stated that while the policy was typed on December 13 it had an 
effective date of November 15, the date of the initial request. 
(Tr., pp. 527-528). 
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Mr. Dougherty testified that on November 15 he received 
a telephone call from the Dyson Agency and orally bound the 
coverage. On November 18 he received the application and pi-
lot history and on December 13 the policy was typed effective 
the date it had been orally bound. (Tr., p. 702). 
These examples relied upon by Dyson to show a "course of 
conduct" completely fail to meet the burden Dyson was obliga-
ted to meet even if it is assumed that such evidence was rele-
vant to the issues in this case. These examples once again 
show that the company would "backdate" new risks only when an 
oral binder had been given or when the agent specifically re-
quested that coverage be effective as of a certain date. In 
these instances the risk was assumed as of those dates and a 
premium was accordingly charged. In the Shannon case, however, 
neither an oral binder nor a specific request for a coverage 
date was made. Thus, these examples are not applicable to the 
Shannon coverage question and do not show a course of conduct 
or custom which Dyson could have relied upon. 
It should be noted that Dyson cited only five separate 
cases of insurance coverage as a basis for his "course of con-
duct" theory. Even if each and every one of the five instances 
was analogous to the Shannon policy such a small number (com-
pared to the 75 transactions Dyson claimed to have had with the 
company) would be legally insufficient to show any pattern upon 
which Dyson could rely. In this case, however, even these five 
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instances are inapplicable. 
In summary, neither the previous transactions of this 
policy nor the examples of other policies showed a course of 
conduct upon which Dyson can now claim implied authority to 
bind coverage. All of the examples were varied and differed 
under the factual context of each policy or endorsement. This 
evidence is hardly the type of conduct relied upon in the Tra-
veler's case in which 300 analogous and consistent transac-
tions had previously occurred. 
C. Torn Dougherty Did Not Make an Admission Which 
was Conclusively Binding Upon Respondents. 
Dyson in his brief quotes several answers to leading ques-
tions in which Mr. Dougherty, Senior Vice President in charge 
of underwriting, allegedly admitted that the company would 
always date a risk as of the time when all of the information 
needed was submitted to the underwriter. (Appellants' brief, 
pp. 19-21). Dyson argues, therefore, that since the Shannon 
application contained all of the necessary information to rate 
Shannon as a pilot that coverage automatically attached as of 
December 8, 1975, date of the request. 
The fallacy in Dyson's argument rests in the fact that 
the addition of Shannon as a pilot resulted in an increased 
risk to the company (Tr., p. 668) which required an additional 
premium. Mr. Dougherty stated in other testimony that when an 
additional risk occurred with the addition of a pilot and an 
-44-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
additional premium was required it was the company policy to 
request that the agent authorize the additional premium before 
the endorsement would be issued. (Tr., p. 633}. Thus, in the 
case of Shannon the company did not have all of the informa-
tion necessary to add Shannon as an insured pilot, i.e., it 
did not have the authorization of the insured to increase the 
premium. 
Mr. Dougherty's testimony concerning this area is as fol-
lows: 
Q. (By Mr. Wadsworth) You are saying when 
you send this memo back saying this 
would increase the premium $100 and 
asking if they still wanted, that was 
a request then from your office for 
further information, wasn't it? 
A. It is a request whether or not they 
want it. It would not have required 
us to suspense the file for follow-
up. 
Q. You are asking for information, right? 
A. Yes. (Tr., p. 597) (Emphasis added). 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Poelman) Do you ever write co-
verages without the insured knowing in 
advance what it is going to cost him? 
A. No. The insured will know what it is 
going to cost him. (Tr., p. 633). 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Poelman) Clarify that ques-
tion further: Were you certain the re-
quest was still outstanding at that 
time? 
A. The request was outstanding because we 
had a premium factor that was still 
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not resolved, that would have per-
mitted us to go any further. 
Q. Did you need to know at this time 
whether they really wa~ted that type 
of flying club coverage? 
A. No, we didn't know. 
Q. So you needed more information, is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that the purpose of the memoran-
dum of Sara Broughton? 
A. Yes. (Tr., p. 634) (Emphasis added). 
Mr. Dougherty also gave two examples where a pilot addi-
tion was requested and where an additional premium was being 
charged because of such addition. The first instance involved 
the Rocky Mountain Sales policy where an effective date of Oc-
tober 29, 1974 was given to the coverage. On May 2, 1975 a 
request was made to add an additional pilot. At that time a 
premium of $25 was quoted to the agent who then agreed to it 
and a binder was issued as of that date. (Tr., p. 652). 
The second example involved the addition of Kesler as a 
pilot. (Tr., p. 654). Dyson's own memorandum sent to A.G.A. 
in Wyoming showed that the additional premium had been quoted 
to Kesler in that the memo of July 21, 1975 stated "We have 
quoted him the $21 increase. Please send us an endorsement add-
ing him as a pilot." (Ex. BDD). Likewise, when the policy was 
changed to limited commercial coverage the September 9 tele-
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phone conversation between Dyson and A.O.A. included the amount 
of the additional premium. (Tr., pp. 589-590). 
It can be assumed that Mr. Dougherty's testimony quoted 
in Appellants' brief was substantially correct--that is, a 
policy would be dated at the time all information had been re-
ceived presuming no specific request had been made by the agent 
of another date or an oral binder had not been issued. How-
ever, Mr. Dougherty's later testimony showed that all of the 
information in the Shannon case was not in and that the appro-
val of the additional premium was as necessary for the under-
writer to issue coverage as was receipt of the Pilot Informa-
tion Form. In both cases coverage would be withheld until the 
information was received from the agent. 
Respondents do not believe it necessary to quote authori-
ties concerning judicial admissions. Appellants' own author-
ity, 31A C.J.S., Evidence, Section 381 (Appellants' brief, p. 
21) adequately states the rule. A judicial admission is not 
binding on a party unless the statement is unequivocal, unex-
plained, and uncontradicted. In this case, Mr. Dougherty's fur-
ther testimony concerning the need of premium addition approval 
supplemented his previous testimony and was entirely consistent 
with Respondents' position throughout the trial. 
For this reason, the trial court did not err in refusing 
to conclude that Mr. Dougherty had made a judicial admission 
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contrary to the position of respondents. 
POINT III 
IT WAS THE DYSON AGENCY, NOT A.O.A. NOR 
RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY, WHICH BREACHED 
ITS DUTY TO COVER KENNETH SHANNON AS A 
PILOT. 
Dyson quotes several authorities in his brief as to the 
duty that an insurance agent or a broker has to a person seek-
ing insurance. (Appellants' brief, p. 26). In the Consoli-
dated Sun Ray case the following quotation is cited by Dyson: 
It is generally considered that if the ne-
glect or breach of duty of such broker re-
sults in loss to his principal, the broker 
is liable to the same extent as the insurer 
would have been liable had the insurance 
been properly effected and must pay the re-
sulting loss. (Appellants' brief, p. 27). 
Dyson argues that he has assumed the role of an insured 
and that A.O.A. and Ranger are the equivalent to his broker or 
agent. Such an assumption is totally erroneous. In this case 
it is clear that Shannon and the other owners of the airplane 
were the insureds and that Dyson acted as their broker. A.O.A. 
and Ranger were merely companies from which Dyson could obtain 
insurance. By no stretch of the imagination can A.O.A. or 
Ranger be defined as a broker or agent of Dyson. 
Utah State law defines a broker as: 
Any person who, on behalf of the insured, 
for compensation as an independent contrac-
tor, or commission, or fee, and not being 
an agent of the insurer, solicits, nego-
tiates, or procures insurance or reinsur-
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ance or the renewal or continuance thereof, 
or in any manner aids therein, for insureds 
or prospective insureds other than himself. 
Section 31-17-2, U.C.A. 
This is contrasted to an "agent" who works directly for the 
company. Section 31-17-1, U.C.A. 
The agency agreement between Ranger Insurance Company and 
Dyson and Associates provides that Dyson shall receive a 15 
per cent commission for all pleasure and business insurance 
policies written. (Ex. 2DD). The statement of premium sent 
to Dyson by A.G.A. also reflects a 15 per cent commission of 
$112.20 for the initial policy coverage. (Ex. SOD). 
Likewise, the testimony at trial clearly shows that Dyson 
was acting as an independent agent on behalf of the airplane 
owners and that Dyson breached his duty to procure coverage for 
Shannon as a pilot. Dyson himself admitted that it was his busi-
ness as an insurance agent to obtain the type of insurance de-
sired by an applicant and that it was Dyson's responsibility 
for obtaining the proper insurance from the appropriate company. 
(Tr., p. 395). Dyson stated that he represented three separate 
companies writing aviation coverage. (Tr., p. 530). Thus, Dyson 
had no allegiance to Ranger Insurance Company and could have 
Placed this risk with any company he desired. 
Mr. Dougherty stated that there were approximately 5,000 
insurance agencies throughout the country which had contracts 
With A.O.A. for soliciting of insurance. (Tr., p. 643). How-
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ever, only six were given binding authority. lTr. , p. 643) . 
The other 5,000 agents did not even have the company's rates 
available to them and had to call either A.O.A. or one of the 
six general agents to obtain quotations. (Tr. 1 p. 627). Even 
the six general agents which had binding authority had to no-
tify the company by the next day of any binders issued. 
p. 627). 
(Tr., 
Dougherty also testified that A.O.A. administers 20 1 000 
policies covering 30 1 000 separate planes. ( Tr • 1 p • 7 0 9 ) . 
Dougherty stated that it is impossible for his company to moni-
tor requests for insurance and that it is the responsibility of 
the soliciting agent to follow through as to any request for 
insurance. (Tr., pp. 597, 711). Dougherty stated that the so-
liciting agent can always call the company and obtain an oral 
binder if they are concerned about coverage and the delay which 
may ensue in the issuance of an endorsement. (Tr.,p.661). 
He stated that Dyson could have called in this case and Shannon 
would have been orally bound had the increased premium been ap-
proved. (Tr., p. 663). Mrs. Cartwright stated that she would 
call and obtain an oral binder if a new risk was being added to 
a policy. (Tr., p. 497). 
It is only equitable and logical that the responsibility 
for obtaining coverage rests upon the soliciting agent. In thi, 
case, for example, Dyson admitted that he gave the keys of the 
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airplane to Shannon althoug~ Dyson did not know whether cover-
age had been extended to Shannon. (Tr., p. 556}. Mrs. Cart-
wright testified that she did not know that Shannon was flying 
the plane at the time the request for coverage had been sub-
mitted to A.O.A. (Tr., p. 762). Certainly Dyson was the per-
son who knew the status and urgency of obtaining insurance 
coverage for Shannon. He knew that Shannon was operating the 
plane and that a risk was being assumed by the owners unless 
illsurance coverage had been extended to cover Shannon. A.O.A. 
and Ranger Insurance Company, on the other hand, had no know-
ledge as to the activities of Shannon or the plane and could 
not know of any urgency in extending coverage. 
The trial court made the following findings concerning the 
responsibility of obtaining the insurance coverage: 
A.O.A. had 5,000 agencies such as Dyson with 
which it had contracts, only six of which 
had authority to bind without written accep-
tance of the risk by A.O.A. The responsibil-
ity of monitoring a request for a change in 
coverage must of necessity rest upon the agen-
cy submitting that request. Six weeks ex-
pired between Cartwright's last oral inquiry 
and the crash of the plane with no further 
effort on Cartwright's part to obtain the 
endorsement for coverage of Shannon. (R., p. 
263; App. p. A-21). 
As to the negligence of the Dyson Agency and to Dyson personally 
the court stated: 
As to the claims of Kesler, Bissell, McClain, 
Oborn, Walker, and Ferguson against the Dysons, 
I find that Donald Dyson both as a partner and 
as an agent of L. F. Dyson and Associates 
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breached his contract wLth his partners to 
obtain insurance coverage for all pilots 
flying said plane. I also find that Donald 
Dyson individually and as an agent for his 
company was negligent in allowing Shannon to 
fly the plane until coverage was accepted on 
Shannon by A.O.A., and also because he knew 
or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have known that Mary Jane Cartwright had not 
yet obtained insurance coverage for Shannon. 
I further find that such negligence was a 
proximate cause of the damages sustained by 
the plaintiffs. (R., p. 264; App. pp. A-21-
A-22) . 
When Dyson agreed to obtain insurance coverage on the air-
plane he was acting as the agent of the owners and not the agent 
of A.O.A. or Ranger Insurance Company. Barnett v. State Auto-
mobile and Casualty Underwriters, 487 P.2d 311 (Utah 1971). As 
such, therefore, he violated the duty referred to in Appellants' 
brief and was accordingly found liable to the owners for this 
breach. The trial court was correct in its decision. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND INFER-
ENCE TO SUPPORT THE MAILING OF THE SARA 
BROUGHTON MEMO. 
Dyson in his brief once again misconstrues the duties and 
roles of the various parties in this case by wrongfully compar-
ing them to other legal cases and authorities involving differ-
ent factual contexts. As noted in the preceding section, the 
Dyson Agency had the burden of obtaining insurance for the air-
plane owners and had the duty of follow-up after the application 
was sent to A.O.A. It was the responsibility of Dyson, not 
A.O.A., to inquire why the coverage had not been written. 
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As sue~, t~erefore, t~ authorities cited by Dyson in ~s 
brief are inappropriate since they concerned situations in 
which an insurance applicant is suing his insurance agent for 
failure to obtain insurance coverage. (Appellants' brief, pp. 
30-34). Had A.O.A. done nothing after receipt of the appli-
cation, it still would have been Dyson's responsibility to in-
quire from A.O.A. as to why a coverage endorsement had not been 
issued. For this reason, the mailing of the Sara Broughton 
memorandum does not assume the critical aspect that it would 
in the case where an agent is attempting to shift the responsi-
bility for failure to obtain insurance back to the insured cli-
ent. 
The mailing of the memo can only go to any claim that 
A.O.A. was negligent in its conduct. As stated previously, 
however, A.O.A. was under no duty to take affirmative action. 
Dyson's failure to follow up on his request amounted to negli-
gence even if it were assumed the memo had never been sent. 
In addition, there was ample evidence that the Sara 
Broughton memorandum had been mailed to Dyson. Miss Broughton 
did not personally appear at the trial. Her deposition had 
previously been taken in Texas and was read into the record. 
Appellants' counsel did not attend the deposition nor did they 
submit written questions pursuant to Rule 31 U.R.C.P. to the 
officer taking the deposition. 
Sara Broughton testified t~t after preparing t~e ~nd-
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written memorandum she "mailed it back to the agent". lR., 
pp. 7 3 9-7 4 0) . 
Since no foundational objection wa5 made at the time of 
the deposition it can be presumed that Sara Broughton actually 
deposited the memorandum in the U.S. mail. Rule 32(d) (3) (A), 
U.R.C.P. provides that objections to the competency, relevancy, 
or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make 
objections before or during the deposition "unless the ground 
of the objection is one which might have been obviated or re-
moved if presented at that time." Had Appellants' counsel ob-
jected to the failure of establishing sufficient foundation as 
to the "mailing", Respondents' counsel could have then inquired 
into Miss Broughton's statement further to determine whether 
or not a sufficient foundation existed. 
Appellants cannot fail to object to such a statement and 
then shift the burden upon the other party after the witness is 
no longer available for further testimony. The fact that Mr. 
Dougherty stated that he did not believe Sara would be the per-
son who would actually place the memo in the mail box is mere-
ly a conflict in testimony between the two witnesses and the 
trial court could choose to believe Sara's statement when 
there was no showing to the contrary. 
Thus, since the memorandum mailing was not a critical fac-
tor in this case and since, in any event, there was sufficient 
evidence to show that A.O.A. had mailed the memorandum the 
-53-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court was correct in concluding that A.O.A. was not lia-
ble to Dysons 
POINT V 
A.O.A. AND RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY COR-
RECTLY DENIED COVERAGE FOR THE LOSS IN 
QUESTION. 
Dyson in his brief argues that A.O.A. and Ranger Insur-
~ce Company wrongfully denied coverage in this case and cites 
several inter-office communications and correspondence from 
the company to the Dyson Agency. (Appellants' brief, pp. 35-
36). Dyson observes that the reasons given for the denial of 
coverage were (1) that Shannon had not been endorsed as a named 
pilot, and (2) Dyson had warranted in his application that he 
was the sole owner of the aircraft. (Appellants' brief, p. 
36) • 
Dyson seems to contend that the insurance company did 
not have the right to question the endorsement coverage nor 
the ownership and that such challenge in some way harmed Dyson. 
It should first be noted that the trial court held that 
Ranger and A.O.A. had not accepted the risk on Shannon as a pi-
lot since no endorsement was specifically made nor was a course 
of conduct shown to impliedly cover Shannon. (R., p. 2631 App. 
p. A-21). Thus, Dyson's discussion concerning the question of 
ownership and any waiver by the insurance company by failure to 
request specific information is irrelevant to the results of 
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this decision. 
The record shows that upon notification of the accident 
A.O.A. received a memorandum from Mary Cartwright requesting 
that Shannon be added as: a pilot and stating, "Actually Mr. 
Dyson sold his interest in this craft to Mr. Shannon". (Ex. 
19DD). Up to that time A.O.A. and Ranger Insurance Company had 
no knowledge that Dyson was not the sole owner of the aircraft. 
Dyson admitted at trial that he made no effort to notify 
the company of the additional owners. (Tr., p. 389). He also 
admitted that had he added Shannon and requested his removal 
from the policy, that a new policy would have to have been writ-
ten since he no longer would have qualified as a named insured. 
(Tr., pp. 418, 421). Mr. Dougherty also stated that had the 
company known that Dyson sold his interest to Shannon it would 
have required that a new policy be written. (Tr., p. 637). 
Thus, the fact that A.O.A. and Ranger raised the problem 
of ownership as a reason for denying the claim was perfectly 
legitimate and shows no bad faith on the part of the company. 
Obviously, this contention was not relied upon by the trial court 
in concluding that Ranger and A.O.A. had no obligation to the 
insureds. Whether A.O.A. and Ranger waived a right to contest 
the ownership provision is a moot question since the answer would 
have no effect whatsoever upon the outcome of this case. 
For these reasons, Dyson's claim of wrongful denial is ob-
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viously without merit since the trial court found the suffi-
cient grounds to deny coverage. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING A TRIAL BY JURY 
Rule 4-2 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
states the following: 
Cases will be set for jury trial only upon 
the filing of a written request for trial 
setting and the payment of the required 
statutory fee. Such written request for 
trial setting, or written demand, and de-
mands for jury trial must be filed at least 
ten (10) days prior to trial or at such 
other time as the trial judge may order. 
Dyson admits that the granting or denying of an applica-
tion for jury trial not made strictly in accord with the rules 
of the court is a matter of discretion. (Appellants' brief, 
p. 40). 
There is no showing that the trial court abused this dis-
cretion in denying the jury trial. Appellants requested no 
hearing as to this matter nor advanced any reasons why a re-
quest had not been previously made. 
The preparation for a jury trial including instructions, 
exhibits, and the method of proof is entirely different from a 
trial to a judge alone. Obviously, the parties would have had 
to make enormous preparation to enlighten a jury of lay people 
as to the various intricacies of the insurance industry and the 
numerous transactions which occurred in this case. A trial to 
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a judge alone, however, would not require sue~ preparation be-
cause the court had sufficient knowledge and expertise in con-
tractual and insurance law that such elaborate explanation and 
proof were not required. 
In light of the t~~e of case this matter involved and the 
complex legal questions presented, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' eleventh-hour re-
quest. 
CONCLUSION 
Both Respondents and Appellants admit that the facts in 
this case are basically undisputed. There is no doubt, for 
example, that the agency agreement between Dyson and Ranger pro-
hibited Dyson from binding coverage without the approval of 
A.O.A. It is also undisputed that no express, written, or oral 
permission was ever granted to Dyson by either A.O.A. or Ran-
ger Insurance Company changing this provision. 
Dyson's sole contention at the trial was that the course 
of conduct between Dyson and Ranger in the past and with this 
particular insurance policy constituted an implied binding au-
thority. 
The law is clear that course of conduct, custom, and usage 
cannot be used to vary the express terms of the written agree-
ment. Thus, regardless of what transactions previously occurred 
Dyson cannot legally as an agent claim he was mislead from the 
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express authority he was gi.ven by the insurance company. 
Dyson cannot step into the shoes of an insured applicant 
and claim apparent or ostensible authority against the insur-
ance company and his authorities and arguments to the contrary 
are therefore invalid. The Traveler's Insurance case, cited 
by Dyson in his brief, is the only case found by the parties 
allowing an agent to recover from the principal by an implied 
binding authority caused from course of conduct. 
While the Traveler's case is not the law in Utah it is 
easily distinguishable on its facts since the insurance com-
pany in this case never mislead Dyson into believing that he 
had binding authority, never accepted premiums after the risk 
of loss had passed, and never conducted enough transactions 
with Dyson concerning endorsements of additional pilots to con-
stitute a course of conduct. 
A review of the transactions involved in this policy and 
the other cases relied upon by Dyson show that in each in-
stance the date of coverage was dependent upon either a spe-
cific request by the insurance agent, an automatic renewal date 
as provided in the policy, a date when all information (includ-
ing the approval of the premium) was available to the under-
writer, or when an oral binder had been made by the company. 
These varied circumstances did not give rise to a course of 
conduct, even assuming such to be relevant, which would mis-
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lead Dyson into believing he had binding authority. 
It was Dyson, not A.O.A., who breached the duty to the 
airplane owners. It was Dyson's responsibility to obtain the 
insurance since he was the only person who knew the exigency 
of the situation and the requirements of the owners. The trial 
court's finding that Dyson had failed to follow up properly 
on this application and had even given Shannon the keys to the 
airplane without confirming coverage is amply supported by the 
record. 
Likewise, the attempt of Dyson to shift the blame upon 
the company regarding the mailing of the Sara Broughton memor-
andum is equally ineffectual. It was Dyson's duty, not A.O.A.'s 
or Ranger's, to follow up and see why coverage had not been af-
forded to Shannon. In any event, however, there was sufficient 
evidence for the trial court to conclude that the memorandum 
had in fact been mailed to the Dyson Agency and that A.O.A. 
acted in good faith. 
Dyson's claim that coverage was wrongfully denied is also 
without merit. The fact that Dyson failed to inform the com-
pany as to the true ownership of the plane and the fact that 
the company was justifiably concerned with this question did not 
show bad faith in denying coverage. However, since the trial 
court only ruled that no specific endorsement had been made co-
vering Shannon as a pilot the question of ownership was moot 
-59-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and i& not relevant to this appeal. 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to grant Appellants a jury trial in view of the late-
~ess of the request, the complexity and difficulty of the case, 
and the hardship which would otherwise have been ~posed on 
the other parties. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed and costs awarded to Respondents. 
R:spectfully submitted,) 
~~~I.A.<'~•-\ \: ',-;< L-._._------
( stuart L. Poelrnan 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
200 South Main, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Aviation Office of America, Inc. 
and Ranger Insurance Company 
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(R., p. 249) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD A. DYSON, ET AL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
AVIATION OFFICE OF AMERICA, 
ET AL, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 234988 
The above entitled case carne on for trial before the Court 
on September 20, 1977, continued through September 23, 1977, 
and was argued on October 4, 1977, following which the Court 
took the case under advisement. At the trial Raymond A. Hintze 
appeared as counsel for plaintiffs Kesler, Bissell, McClain, 
Oborn, and Walker and R. Clark Arnold appeared as counsel for 
intervening plaintiff Ferguson. H. Wayne Wadsworth appeared as 
counsel for third party defendants LeRoy F. Dyson and L. F. Dy-
son and Associates, Inc., with Wallace R. Lauchnor appearing 
as counsel for Donald A. Dyson as plaintiff and third party de-
fendant. Stuart L. Poelman appeared as counsel for defendants 
and third party plaintiffs Aviation Office of America (herein-
after referred to as AOA) and Ranger Insurance Company (herein-
after referred to as Ranger) . 
Since the case involved third party complaints and cross 
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claims a brief summary of the pleadings appears necessary to 
help put the issues in focus. The case arises out of the 
crash of an airplane, a twin engine Cessna Turbo Skymaster, 
FAA No. N 2496S, which occurred on February 1, 1976, in Salt 
Lake County. The plane was purchased in March, 1975 under an 
oral and rather informal partnership arrangement by five of 
the original plaintiffs, Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, McClain and 
Oborn. The purchase price was $27,000.00 and was entirely fi-
nanced by Walker Bank and Trust Company with said five parties 
all signing a promissory note. The bank required full insur-
ance coverage which Dyson as an insurange (sic) agent associa-
ted with his father, LeRoy F. Dyson, in L. F. Dyson and Asso-
ciates, a Nevada Corporation, assured his partners he would and 
did obtain. 
(R., p. 250) 
Dyson readily admits his responsibility to obtain such insur-
ance and likewise readily admits his liability or that of his 
agency to his partners and their assignees if it be determined 
that the plane in fact was not covered by the insurance policy 
at the time it crashed on February 1, 1976, because it was the! 
being flown by defendant Shannon. Walker appears as plaintiff 
in this case by reason of an agreement between him and McClain 
by which Walker purchased McClain's interest in the plane, but 
w ith McClain remaining liable on the note to the bank and Wal 
ker not being a signator thereon. Ferguson appears as an in-
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tervening plaintiff by reason of the fact that under an agree-
ment dated October 15, 1975, plaintiff Oborn contracted to sell 
~is interest in the plane to Ferguson, but with Oborn remain-
ing liable on the note to the bank and Ferguson not being a sig-
nator thereon. 
The Dyson insurance agency had an agency contract with AOA 
who in turn were underwriters of insurance for Ranger. AOA 
dealt exclusively with aviation insurance. Donald A. Dyson 
through his own agency obtained a policy of insurance covering 
said plane, the details concerning which and the endorsements 
thereto will more fully be hereinafter set forth. Donald A. Dy-
son alone was the named insured. Dyson contracted to sell his 
interest in the plar.e to defendant Kenneth R. Shannon in Decem-
ber, 1975, and it was Shannon who was flying the plane on Febru-
ary 1, 1976, when it crashed in Salt Lake County. AOA and Ran-
ger denied the claim for damages to the plane which was totally 
wrecked but which brought a salvage value of $4,236.00, which 
amount, when received, was paid over to Walker Bank. The rea-
son for Ranger denying coverage was its claim that Shannon was 
not an authorized pilot under the policy, as will more fully be 
set out in a summary of the evidence which follows. 
(R., p. 251) 
After the claim was denied attorney Hintze filed a 
complaint on behalf of Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, McClain, Oborn 
and Walker naming AOA, Ranger and Shannon as defendants. Mr. 
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Hintze later withdrew as counsel for Donald Dyson individually 
as the insured and attorney Lauchnor filed an appearance as 
counsel for Donald Dyson. By this complaint the plaintiffs 
therein allege the policy was in full force and effect and 
covered Shannon as pilot and thus they seek to recover the face 
amount of the policy of $27,000, costs, other relief as may 
seem just, and, as added by amendment, interest on the value 
of the aircraft from the date of loss to the date of payment. 
In a separate count of the complaint it is alleged that Shannon 
was negligent in his operation of the plane and plaintiffs seek 
to recover the sum of $29,000, the alleged fair market value of 
the plane, and costs from Shannon. 
Based upon a motion filed by attorney Hintze for his cli-
ents the Court on September 2, 1976, entered an order authori-
zing service of summons on Shannon by mail pursuant to Rule 4(f) 
(2) and said service was effected by the County Clerk's office 
mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to Shannon on Sep-
tember 9, 1976. Shannon filed no answer to the complaint and 
his default was ordered entered by the Court. Neither Dyson, 
AOA or Ranger filed any pleading against Shannon and Donald Dy-
son never obtained service on Shannon. 
In response to plaintiffs' complaint AOA and Ranger an-
swered, denying liability or coverage with Shannon as pilot, 
denying Dyson had authority to bind coverage, alleging express 
refusal to cover Shannon and setting forth other defenses. Said 
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parties also filed a third party complaint against Donald and 
LeRoy Dyson and the Dyson Corporation, alleging the filing of 
the complaint and asserting that if said parties were deter-
mined to be liable under the policy, said third party defen-
dants were liable to them for negligence, breach of duty as 
agents to third party plaintiffs and intentional misrepresen-
tation of facts in the various particulars alleged. 
(R., p. 252) 
In answer thereto the Dysons denied liability to AOA and 
Ranger, or that they ~cted wrongfully, and affirmatively allege 
an estoppel as a defense, based upon an alleged establishrr.ent 
of a course of conduct with respect to endorsements on changes 
in coverage, and contributory neqligence. 
Following the filing of the third party complaint by AOA 
and Ranger against the Dysons, plaintiffs Kesler, Bissell, Mc-
Clain, Oborn and Walker filed a cross claim against the Dysons, 
alleging breach of Donald Dyson's agreement to obtain insurance 
coverage on the plane, seeking damages including attorney's 
fees. In reply the Dysons allege their agency did all they 
were obligated to do in obtaining insurance coverage on the 
Plane and allege negligence by these plaintiffs as a defense: 
(At the trial these defenses were dropped and the Dyson agency 
admitted liability to said plaintiffs if no insurance coverage 
was found to exist) . 
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Based upon the cross claim of said plaintiffs against the 
Dysons, the Dysons filed a counterclaim against AOA and Ranger 
alleging that if they were found liable to those plaintiffs, 
AOA and Ranger were liable to them, asserting that AOA failed 
to reject an application to add Shannon as a pilot covered by 
the policy, and that by reason of a prior course of conduct 
and a failure to davise the Dysons to the contrary, they im-
pliedly agreed to such coverage. Further the Dysons allege AOA 
had a duty to advise the Dysons that Shannon was not covered by 
the policy and that such failure constituted negligence for 
which AOA and Ranger should be held liable to them. In reply 
to this counterclaim AOA and Ranger deny such liability and by 
way of affirmative defenses, said partles allege contributory 
negligence of Dysons, plead estoppel for failure to diligently 
respond to correspondence and inquiry about coverage of Shannon, 
allege misrepresentations of Dyson concerning ownership, and 
assumption of risk. 
(R., p. 253) 
At a pretrial settlement conference held on September 12, 
1977, it was stipulated by all counsel that plaintiff Ferguson 
could intervene as Oborn's vendee. He has done so and stands 
in the same shoes as the other individ~al plaintiffs other than 
Donald Dyson. 
In this memorandum I shall not undertake to summarize the 
testimony of the respective witnesses as called, but rather will 
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summarize what I consider to be the material and relevant 
facts as established by the evidence. 
AOA underwrites aviation insurance for Ranger and other 
insurance compan~es, and as such has agency contracts with some 
5,000 agents throughout the country, only six of whom have writ-
ten authority to bind AOA and its insurers on aviation policies 
without the prior approval of AOA. On February 14, 1968, Ran-
ger through AOA executed an agency agreement with LeRoy and 
Donald Dyson, dba L. F. Dyson and Associates by which the Dy-
sons were appointed "agent" of Ranger for aviation hazards only. 
The agreement, among other things, contained the following pro-
vision: 
"Nothing herein shall be construed as authori-
zing the agent to commit or bind the company 
to any liability without the prior approval of 
Aviation Office of America, Inc." 
The agency agreement remained in force throughout the per-
iod relating to this case. On December 30, 1974, Ranger through 
AOA entered into an agency agreement with Aviation General Agency 
(hereinafter called AGA) of Cody, Wyoming appointing AGA as an 
agent with authority to bind AOA and represented insurance com-
panies on "business and pleasure" risks, but with no authority 
to bind on "limited commercial" risks, within the stated limits 
of coverage. Dyson was advised of the availability of AGA as 
an agency authorized to act for AOA. 
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(R., p. 254) 
In march, (sic) 1975, Donald Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, Mc-
Clain and Oborn orally agreed to purchase the Cessna plane in 
question as equal partners for $27,000. They borrowed the full 
amount of the purchase price from Walker Bank & Trust Company 
on March 18, 1975, and jointly signed a promissory note, on 
which they each became jointly and severally liable, for the 
face amount of $38,519.88 (interest rate of 10.58%), payable 
in 84 successive monthly installments of $458.57 each commenc-
ing April 25, 1975. The note was secured by a security agree-
ment on the plane. At the time of the transaction Walker Bank 
stated that the plane must be fully insured. Donald Dyson 
agreed with his other four partners that he would take care 
of obtaining the required insurance coverage on the plane, it 
being known by his said four partners that he was then in the 
insurance business as an insurance agent, and he then knew 
that they were relying upon him to do so. At the trial the Dy-
sons acknowledged that Donald Dyson had a duty to obtain the 
required insurance coverage. At this time only Donald Dyson 
was a licensed pilot and it was the intent of the other four 
partners to learn to fly the plane and to be licensed therefor. 
Donald Dyson then had prepared, and he signed, an "appli-
cation" for aircraft insurance on an AOA form, requesting in-
surance on the Cessna plane with a liability coverage of $27,000 
on the plane for all risks while in motion. The application 
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showed only Donald A. Dyson as the insured, marking it as an 
"individual" ownership rather than a "partnership" ownership. 
In section 7 of the application it named Donald A. Dyson and 
Jim Breeze, an FAA Examiner, as pilots with "additional pilots 
to be added as they qualify". Walker Bank was shown as mort-
gagee. 
On March 22, 1975, Mary Jane Cartwright, an employee of 
Dyson, forwarded the written application to "Aviation Office 
of America, P. 0. Box 7, Cody, Wyoming, " which was the address 
of AGA. It stated that an application "to be effective 3/21/75 
covering a 1968 Cessna for Donald A. Dyson was enclosed, request-
ing a policy at the earliest convenience, stating the purpose 
was "pleasure" and suggesting language for the pilot clause. 
(R. I p. 255) 
On March 26, 1975, AGA insured binder 1020 confirming it 
had bound with AOA insurance coverage on the plane for 30 days 
effective March 26, 1975. Based upon said application, policy 
No. AC Al-198882 was issued by Ranger to Donald Dyson as the 
named insured, under date of April l, 1975, and effective from 
i1arch 26, 1975 to March 26, 1976. The total premium was stated 
as $748.00 with $400.00 thereof being charged for the $27,000 
liability for all risks while in motion. The pilot clause pro-
vided that "Only the following pilot or pilots holding valid 
and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as 
required by FAA for the flight involved will fly the craft". 
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Then followed the names Donald A. Dyson or Jim Breeze (to-
gether with private or commercial pilots with a minimum num-
ber of logged hours which phrase admittedly did not cover any 
of the parties hereinvolved). 
The policy contained a provision in paragraph 19 thereof 
which provided as follows: " ••. nor shall the terms of this 
policy be waived or changed, except by improved endorsement 
issued to form a part of this policy, signed by the authorized 
company representative". 
In April, 1975, the premium due on the policy was billed 
to L.F. Dyson and Associates by AGA. 
Mary Jane Cartwright handled the processing of insurance 
for the Dyson agency and Donald Dyson had nothing to do with 
contacting AOA or Ranger on the policy. 
The first steps to effecting a change in the policy occur-
red on July 21, 1975, when a request was made of AGA by Cart-
wright to add plaintiff Kesler as a pilot to be covered. Cart-
wright did not recall how her contact with AGA was made to ini-
tiate this change but on that date AGA through David Brannon 
sent a handwritten communication to Tom Dougherty at AOA "con-
firming our telcon of today" and stating effective "7-22", AOA 
was to change use to include rental and also adding Stephen 
Kesler as a named pilot and stating liability premium was in-
creased $21.00 and the Hull coverage by $203.00. 
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(R., p. 256) 
Also on July 21, 1975, Cartwright typed a written note to 
oave Brannon in Cody saying "Sorry - change signals again" and 
telling him to delete the earlier request to cover rental of 
the plane commercially. She then stated it was necessary to 
change the pilot clause to include Kesler, stating some facts 
~out his experience, saying the $21.00 increase had been quo-
ted to him and concluding by saying "Please send us an endorse-
ment adding him as a pilot." 
By a memo dated August 20, 1975, from the AOA office in 
Beaumont, Texas, to L. F. Dyson and Associates a request was 
~de to forward pilot information on Kesler as AOA needed to 
know specific information "before we can add as approved pilot." 
On August 26, 1975, Cartwright wrote Brannon at AGA in 
Cody requesting addition of Tim Bissell as a pilot and also 
stating therein that "we had previously requested that you add 
Stephen Kesler, however we have not received any confirmation 
from you that these are being added. We would appreciate a 
note to that affect (sic) for our file." This was received in 
the AGA office on August 28, 1975, and on a copy thereof, under 
date of September 24, 1975, Sara Broughton of AOA in Texas 
wrote "before we can approve above pilot please have the at-
tached pilot form completed by Tim Bissell." 
On September 9, 1975, Tom Dougherty made a written record 
of a telephone conversation he had with "Dyson" requesting a 
change of use to limited commercial and to add two pilots, Bis-
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sel and Kesler. 
On September 17, 1975, the AOA office in Texas sent a 
communication to L. F. Dyson and Associates requesting advice 
as to Bissell's first name so he could be added as a named 
pilot and stating that an endorsement adding Kesler as pilot 
and changing use to limited commercial was then being typed. 
That endorsement was issued, dated September 17, 1975, showing 
Kesler as an added pilot and the purpose of use as "limited 
commercial" with a total additional premium of $302.00, with 
the effective date of the endorsement being July 22, 1975, 
which was the date, as noted above, that it had been agreed by 
Dougherty (AOA) in his telephone communication with Brannon 
(AGA) on July 21, 1975, would be the effective date for adding 
coverage on Kesler as a pilot. 
(R., p. 257) 
The requested pilot experience form, updated, was filled 
out, signed by Bissell, and submitted so that an endorsement 
was issued December 2, 1975, by AOA for Ranger amending Item 7 
of the policy to add "Torn Bissell". The effective date of this 
endorsement was November 13, 1975, which was the date the pilot 
information sheet was forwarded to AOA in Dallas by Cartwright 
on Bissell. No additional premium was required on Bissell. 
As noted supra, McClain had sold his interest to Walker 
and Oborn had sold to Ferguson under a contract dated October 
15, 1975, in which Ferguson agreed to pay Oborn's share of the 
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amount due Walker Bank. 
After the contract of sale to Ferguson on November 5, 1975, 
:-1ary Jane Cartwright sent a memorandum to AOA, but addressed it 
toP. 0. Box 7 in Cody, Wyoming, stating they had another name 
to add to the policy - Gary Ferguson - and for this they needed 
additional pilot information forms to be completed and reques-
ted a small supply for Dyson's use. Brannon at AGA replied to 
this by directing that they "use Item #7 of the regular appli-
cation." 
On November 13, 1975, in Cartwright's memorandum to AOA 
in Dallas enclosing Bissell's pilot information sheet (men-
tioned supra), she also requested more pilot information forms 
"as we have another commercial pilot to be added to this policy". 
Thereafter, Mary Jane Cartwright forwarded on December 4, 
1975, a memorandum to AOA in Dallas, Texas, enclosing a pilot's 
statement on Ferguson, requested that Breeze be deleted, re-
quested a confirming memo and stated that since Ferguson had 
so many hours, it was doubtful the rate would be affected. 
(R. I p. 258) 
Under date of December 10, 1975, AOA issued an endorsement ef-
fective December 4, 1975, amending Item 7 to show Bissell, Dy-
son, Kesler and Ferguson as the pilots covered. No change in 
premium resulted. 
Also, about December 1, 1975, Dyson sold his interest in 
the plane to Kenneth Richard Shannon on a contract under which 
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Shannon agreed to assume Dyson's obligation to lvalker Bank. 
Dyson's partners in the plane voiced concern about Shannon's 
qualifications and ability, but he made some inquiry, advised 
them he was licensed by FAA and experienced and assured them 
they were protected in their investment by insurance coverage. 
However, Dyson did not advise either AOA or AGA of the sale of 
his ownership interest to Shannon nor did he request any change 
in the policy. He only told Mary Jane Cartwright to take the 
necessary steps to get Shannon's name added to the policy as 
a pilot. Dyson did not tell Cartwright to have his own name 
dropped as a pilot or as the insured nor did he tell her he 
had sold his interest in the plane to Shannon. Dyson either 
gave Shannon a key to the plane or left it with Cartwright for 
Shannon to pick up although Cartwright had no recollection that 
she received the key from Dyson or gave it to Shannon. 
Thereafter, on December 8, 1975, Cartwright forwarded an 
office memorandum to AOA in Dallas, Texas, enclosing a pilot 
experience form on Shannon stating he was to be included as a 
pilot under the policy and requesting an endorsement to this 
effect. This communication was received by AOA in Dallas and 
on December 15, 1975, Sara Broughton, an employee of AOA whose 
underwriting duty it was to make changes in existing policies, 
wrote in reply thereto the following: 
"This risk has reached a flying club expo-
sure. To add this pilot it will be a fully 
earned premium of $100. Please advise if 
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you want him added." 
(R., p. 259) 
In a deposition taken in Dallas, Texas on September 13, 
1977, Sara Broughton testified she mailed this response to the 
Dyson agency. Mary Jane Cartwright denied ever seeing this re-
sponse or having received it in the mail. Dyson too denied ever 
having received or seeing it. Thus, no further written commu-
nication was sent in response thereto and no endorsement add-
ing Shannon's name was ever issued by AOA. Cartwright testi-
fied that in talking to Torn Dougherty in connection with a file 
on one Don Rich on December 16, 1975, she asked him about the 
endorsement on Shannon, stating he said he would look into it. 
Dougherty did not personally recall this telephone conversa-
tion with Cartwright but did not deny having it as his file on 
Rich contained notes of a telephone call from Cartwright on 
December 16, 1975, but they contained no reference to Shannon. 
If Dougherty received this call and did in fact look into it, 
a reasonable inference is that he would have seen Broughton's 
reply of Dece~er 15, 1975, set out above and may reasonably 
have assumed Cartwright would be receiving it shortly. Cart-
wright also testified she recalled asking Dougherty about the 
Shannon endorsement in talking to him on a policy for one Dick 
Reynolds. However, Dougherty's file on Reynolds shows his pol-
icy was not effective until November 15, 1976, some 10-1/2 
months after the plane crashed on February 1, 1976. 
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The crash occurred on that date with Shannon at the con-
trols and flying it. As noted, the plane was totally wrecked. 
A notation on a claim form dated February 2, 1976, indicated 
the accident occurred because while landing, the runway was 
missed, and the plane hit power lines and crashed. It appears 
Shannon's wife and two children were injured in the crash and 
hospitalized as a result thereof. 
On February 15, 1976, Cartwright wrote a letter to Dough-
erty at AOA enclosing a copy of the Dyson memo "dated December 
7, 1975" (actually dated December 8) wherein "we requested that 
you add Kenneth Shannon as a pilot to the above captioned policy 
in the name of Mr. Dyson." 
(R., p. 260) 
She further stated: "We have never received a confirming 
memo or endorsement to the policy. Actually Mr. Dyson sold 
his interest in the craft to Mr. Shannon. We would appreciate 
an endorsement at your earliest convenience", adding a post-
script "Perhaps this request hit your office when you were in 
the process of moving and thus the delay. We would appreciate 
the endorsement." 
The move by AOA from Beaumont to Dallas had in fact been 
made in the s~~er of 1975. 
Dougherty replied on March 1, 1976, noting that "we quoted 
the amount of premium required to add pilot but did not receive 
a response". He also said it was not customery (sic) to assign 
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policies and advance approval of the company would be needed. 
Dougherty's files also contained notations dated March l, 1976 
of a telephone call with Tom Lehman (manager) General Adjust-
ment Bureau, Albuquerque, New Mexico) (sic) in which he recorded 
that they did not add the pilot because they had "no reply to 
Sara B's 12/15 memo". 
It was stipulated that the proof of loss or claim required 
under the policy had been duly filed. 
By letter dated March 30, 1976, to Donald A. Dyson, Tom 
Lehman advised that he regretted to advise him that there was 
no coverage ~nder the policy for the claims arising out of 
the accident, as Shannon was not a named pilot under the terms 
of the policy nor did he qualify under the open pilot endorse-
ment. It further stated that Dyson had warranted under tne 
application for aircraft insurance that he was the sole owner, 
but that the records of the FAA and their own f'J.rther investi-
gation indicated this information was incorrect. 
From the foregoing facts it is thus apparent that no writ-
ten endorsement approving the addition of the name of Shannon 
as a pilot to Item 7 of the policy was ever issued. It is also 
apparent that Donald Dyson did nothing more to get Shannon's 
name added to the policy as a pilot than to direct Mary Cart-
Wright to do it and that he released the key to Shannon without 
ever making any inquiry of her as to whether the coverage for 
Shannon had in fact been effected. Cartwright testified that 
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at this time her work load in the office was heavy and that per-
haps she was not following up on endorsement requests as she 
should have done. 
(R., p. 261) 
Counsel for the Dysons contends that in the course of 
dealing between Dyson and AOA, whether it be through AGA or 
direct, binding coverage was effecteJ by the submission of a 
completed pilot information form together with a request for 
issuance of an endorsement making such change, and that the 
issuance or receipt of a signed endorsement making such cover-
age effective was not necessary. In support of this contention 
counsel further contends that AOA's alleged established prac-
tice of making the effective date of the coverage the same as 
the date of the submission of the request for coverage and the 
completed pilot information form, rather than the date the en-
dorsement was issued, shows that coverage was binding upon Dy-
son's submission of such information and that Shannon was co-
vered notwithstanding the lack of issuance of a written endorse-
ment. 
In support of these contentions counsel points to the 
course of dealing on the policy in question as well as in the 
issuance of six other policies about which testimony was given. 
I have considered the testimony with respect to these other po-
licies and do not find the facts support counsel's contention 
that a course of dealing was established from which it can be 
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found that coverage was binding upon submission of the pilot 
information forms. Some of the policies relied on to show 
such course of dealing did not deal with adding pilots to 
policies and in some the effective date was made in conformity 
with a specific request for making the effective date that of 
a specific date. The thread which Dysons seek to grasp to 
support their contention that a course of dealing was esta-
blished does not run through all of the policy cases upon which 
evidence was given. 
{R., p. 262) 
The strongest element in Dysons' argument is the practice 
of AOA in making the effective date of the endorsement or po-
licy that of the date of submission of the request together with 
the required information, rather than the date of typing such 
endorsement or policy. Counsel cites Lewis v. Travelers Insur-
ance Company, 239 A.2d 4 as a case in point. In that case the 
practice of "backdating" the policy to the date of the request 
was shown to have existed in some 300 policies and the Court 
ruled that this practice implied, as between principal and agent, 
authority in the agent to bind a risk pending "the principal's 
decision on the application". The Court goes on to say that not-
withstanding a written contract that in effect requires written 
authorization or acceptance, the parol evidence rule did not bar 
Proof of changes subsequent to the execution of the integrated 
writing. 
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Accepting those principles, in the case at bar it cannot 
be said that the proof submitted establishes a confirmed prac-
tice of "backdating" from which can be implied the authority 
of Dyson to bind the risk on a new pilot merely by the submis-
sion of a pilot information form. In Kesler's case the effec-
tive date of the risk of July 22, 1975, was based upon AOA's 
specific acceptance through Dougherty in his telephone call 
from Brannon at AGA of the risk as to Kesler as a pilot, even 
though it took until September 17, 1975, to get the required in-
formation to AOA to issue the endorsement. 
In Bissell's case the initial request was made in August, 
1975, at which time it is by no means clear that Mary Jane Cart-
wright even was aware of the requirement for submission of a 
pilot information form. In the weeks that followed the endorse-
ment when finally issued was made effective November 13, 1975, 
the date the information form was finally submitted by Cart-
wright. 
In Ferguson's case the endorsement was requested December 
4, 1975, and was issued December 10, 1975, dropping Breeze from 
coverage and adding Ferguson without any change in premium. 
(R. I p. 262) 
In Shannon's case the request involved a change in the 
coverage to a "flying club" status, as well as an additional 
premium, and it is apparent from the memo of Sara Broughton of 
December 15, 1975, that the status change was of major signifi-
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cance although the matter of additional premium payments was 
®iformly discussed and agreed upon before an endorsement ef-
fecting a change was agreed to and issued by the company. 
Broughton's note to Dyson, the receipt of which was denied, 
does not support an implication that as of that date Ranger 
was bound on Shannon and so understood it. 
AOA had 5,000 agencies such as Dyson with which it had 
contracts, only six of which had authority to bind without writ-
ten acceptance of the risk by AOA. The responsibility of moni-
toring a request for a change in coverage must of necessity 
rest upon the agency submitting that request. Six weeks ex-
pired between Cartwright's last oral inquiry and the crash of 
the plane with no further effort on Cartwright's part of obtain 
the endorsement for coverage of Shannon. 
I therefore find that as of February l, 1976, when Shannon 
crashed the plane while flying it, AOA and Ranger had not accep-
ted the risk on Shannon as a pilot, had issued no endorsement 
~d are not liable to Donald A. Dyson individually as the insured 
~der the policy nor to the Dyson agency under the policy in ques-
tion. As to AOA and Ranger as against all other parties, I find 
the issues in favor of AOA and Ranger and render a judgment of 
no cause of action. 
As to the claims of Kesler, Bissell, McClain, Oborn, Walker 
and Ferguson against the Dysons, I find that Donald Dyson both 
as a partner and as an agent of L. F. Dyson and Associates 
A-21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
breached his contract with his partners to obtain insurance 
coverage for all pilots flying said plane. I also find that 
Donald Dyson individually and as agent for his company was ne-
gligent in allowing Shannon to fly the plane until coverage 
was accepted on Shannon by AOA, and also because he knew or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should have known that Hary 
Jane Cartwright had not yet obtained insurance coverage for 
Shannon. 
(R., p. 264) 
I further find that such negligence was a proximate cause of 
the damages sustained by the plaintiffs. 
As to damages plaintiffs seek recovery for loss of their 
plane as well as interest on the value of the aircraft since 
the date the claim was denied by Ranger, interest paid to Wal-
ker Bank and which must yet be paid pending final settlement, 
and attorney's fees incurred by the litigation in question. 
For loss of the plane said plaintiffs are entitled to dam· 
ages for breach of contract in the amount of the insurance co-
verage plaintiffs would have received had Donald Dyson obtaine< 
insurance coverage for Shannon's flying of the plane. This 
would be 4/5 of the insurance coverage of $27,000.00, less sal 
vage value. For damages caused by Dyson's negligence plain-
tiffs would be entitled to 4/5 of the fair market value of the 
plane as of February 1, 1976, less salvage value. The maximum 
recovery allowed would be the greater of either of these two 
amounts. 
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As to interest, plaintiffs are entitled to recover from 
defendants Dyson interest on the amount of their recovery at 
6% per annum from February 1, 1976, until paid. No recovery 
for interest paid by plaintiffs to Walker Bank is recoverable 
since they are allowed interest on damages from the loss of the 
plane and would have paid interest to Walker Bank irrespective 
of the loss of the plane. 
As to attorneys' fees, counsel for said plaintiffs claim 
they are entitled to recover such fees under the rule as stated 
by the Supreme Court of Utah in Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Ind. Co., 7 U 2d 377, 325 P 2d 906, 
wherein the court said the general rule that attorney's fees 
are not generally recoverable unless expressly provided for by 
contract or authorized by statute applies 
" ... to claims for attorney's fees within 
the action itself •.. ", 
but that the rule as to what damages are recoverable for breach 
of contract is based upon the concept of reasonable forseeability 
that loss of such general character would result from the breach. 
(R., p. 265) 
Therefore, to be compensable, the loss must result from the 
breach in the natural and usual course of events, so that it 
can fairly and reasonably be said that if the minds of the par-
ties had adverted to breach when the contract was made, loss of 
such character would have been within their contemplation. 
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Is this rule applicable under the facts of the case now 
before the court? 
In the case just cited the defendant Hartford had fur-
nished a bond for a general contractor on wh~ch the plaintiff, 
a title insurance company, was made obligee with the bond re-
citing it would save the title insurance company harmless from 
defaults on the part of the contractor with respect to each lot 
in the subdivision involved therein. When the contractor failed 
to pay material and labor costs on various lots, liens were 
filed and foreclosed which the title insurance company had to 
defend, settle and pay. This involved incurring attorney's 
fees in resolving the lien claims and in holding that such at-
torney's fees were recoverable under the afore~entioned rule, 
the court said that applying the rule to the case, it could 
reasonably be foreseen that the natural and usual consequence 
of the contractor's failure to pay the laborers and materialmen 
would bring about the series of events which occurred; namely 
that liens would be filed and legal proceedings instituted to 
enforce them; that the plaintiff title insurance company, having 
the duty to keep the titles clear, would interpose defenses and 
attend to some disposition of the claims which would require the 
services of attorneys and court costs incidental thereto and 
which was the type of loss for which Hartford's bond was given 
to guard against. 
[R., p. 266) 
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In the two ALR annotations cited by trr. Arnold in his 
brief (45 ALR 2d 1183 and 4 ALR 3rd 270) the fact situations 
described to which the Hartford case rule applies all suggest 
that the claim for attorney's fees must be fees incurred in a 
separate prior litigation with third parties which the party 
claiming attorney's fees was required to defend because of the 
negligence or breach of contract of the party against whom re-
covery of such fees is now being sought. The annotation at 45 
ALR 2d 1183 puts it this way: 
"It (exception to the general rule) involves 
the question whether plaintiff, having been 
involved in litigation with others through 
the tortious act of the defendant, may in a 
separate action recover as part of the dam-
ages the attorney's fees incurred by him in 
the earlier litigation with such third per-
son. 
"In order that this question may arise the 
following elements must be present: (1) 
Plaintiff must have incurred attorney's fees 
in the prosecution or defense of a prior ac-
tion .... (2) The litigation must have been 
against a third party and not against the de-
fendant in the present action. (3) Plaintiff 
must have become involved in such litigation 
because of some tortious of the defendant ••• " 
To answer the question stated supra, we must examine the 
facts of the case. When the five original partners purchased 
the plane, no written partnership agreement was ever drawn up 
and Donald Dyson's four partners looked to him as a partner and 
insurance agent to obtain the required insurance coverage on 
the plane. He did so but failed to complete the necessary steps 
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to get coverage on Shannon before releasing the plane to Shan-
non to fly at Shannon's will. However, the policy he obtained 
named only Donald Dyson as the insured, with him representing 
in his application that he as the named insured was the sole 
owner of the plane. (Item 9 of the policy). Dyson never ad-
vised AOA or Ranger of any ownership interest in Kesler, Bis-
sell, Oborn or ~cClain, nor in Walker as McClain's vendee, nor 
in Ferguson as Oborn's vendee, nor in Shannon as his own vendee. 
Thus, none of these parties were a named insured under the pol-
icy and none of them would have been entitled to receive or re-
cover the policy coverage had coverage for Shannon been effec-
ted. Walker Bank as the mortgagee would have been entitled to 
first claim on the proceeds and the individual partners or 
their vendees would have had to look to Dyson for their share 
of the insurance proceeds, if any, over and above the amount 
payable to the bank. 
(R., p. 267) 
The significance of this fact is that from the beginning 
none of the partner-owners except Dyson had any claim against 
AOA or Ranger on the policy. The claim, if any, was solely Dy-
son's as the named insured. But when the lawsuit was started, 
the complaint was filed by Donald Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, Mc-
Clain, Oborn and Walker as plaintiffs and AOA, Ranger and Shan-
non as defendants. It was not until after AOA and Ranger filed 
their answer and their third party complaint against the Dysons 
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and their com9any, that counsel for plaintiffs withdrew as 
attorney for Donald Dyson and thereafter asserted a claim on 
behalf of the other plaintiffs against Donald Dyson, his fa-
ther and their company. They nevertheless pursued their claim 
against AOA and Ranger notwithstanding the fact that none of 
them were named insureds under the policy and had no evidence 
that either AOA or Ranger was aware of their ownership interest 
in the plane. 
Their remedy in this case was against the Dysons, not AOA 
or Ranger, a fact which appeared to have been recognized at 
the time of trial with the Dysons assuming the burden of try-
ing to establish coverage of Shannon under the policy in the 
trial. At the beginning of the trial it was stipulated that if 
coverage for Shannon was not established, Donald Dyson and his 
company, having the duty to obtain coverage in the first place, 
would be liable to plaintiffs if he had indeed failed to do so. 
Thus it seems apparent to me that the attorneys' fees in-
curred by the plaintiffs were incurred in the pursuit of their 
claim against the Dysons and are fees claimed 
"within the action itself", 
not in a prior action, so as to render them non-recoverable un-
der the general rule that such are not recoverable unless ex-
pressly provided for by contract as stated in the Hartford case. 
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(R., p. 268) 
Not being named insureds under the policy, it does not appear 
to me that it can be said that under such circumstances it 
could be reasonably foreseeable that plaintiffs would incur 
attorneys' fees in pursuing a claim against AOA and Ranger on 
a policy in which they had no legal interest. Their remedy 
is and always has been against the Dysons for breach of con-
tract and negligence, under neither of which cause of action 
can they recover attorneys' fees, and I so find. 
As to Ferguson, he stands with Oborn in the same pair of 
shoes and can recover no more in this case than Oborn. One 
thing more needs to be said in regards to Ferguson's claim for 
attorney's fees. He intervened as a plaintiff at the pretrial 
hearing held a week before trial upon stipulation of counsel 
that his rights in the case were no more than those of Oborn. 
In his memorandum in support of his claim for attorney's fees 
and expenses of litigation, counsel states that the bulk of his 
fees arose "when Ferguson was forced to join the instant litiga-
tion". This position is based upon a suggestion made at the 
pretrial settlement conference that if he did not join as a par-
ty, he might be collaterally estopped from asserting any future 
claim in the case. I cannot accept the suggestion made by the 
pretrial conference judge as either an order that he must join 
or a ruling that if he did not do so, collateral estoppel would 
bar him from future recovery on any claim he may have to assert. 
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However, he did join as an intervening plaintiff in a case 
that involved a claim against AOA and Ranger as well as the 
Dysons and the foregoing ruling made with respect to recover-
ing attorney's fees for his vendor, Oborn, and the others must 
apply equally well to him. 
While it is regrettable under the facts of this case that 
plaintiffs incurred attorneys' fees by ending up pursuing their 
rights against the Dysons, the court cannot for the reasons sta-
ted allow attorneys' fees as an element of damage in their re-
covery against the Dysons. 
A-29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
